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I '  
The purpose of the study was to determine what the 
courts have said regarding the condition of equipment and 
facilities in school-sponsored sport programs, to determine 
specifio trends emerging from the cases, and to develop 
practical guidelines to assist educators. ' Each case was 
analyzed to determine the school-sponsored sport program 
in whioh the injury occurred and the age, role, and sex of 
the injured party, and the sport or activity in whioh the 
injury occurred. The legal prinoiple applied by the court 
and legal precedent established also were considered in 
ascertaining whether recovery to the injured party was 
denied or allowed. 
The courts have given specifio direction about 
equipment and faoilities. Both must meet the standards 
considered usual and oustomary by the profession, must be 
inspected regularly, and must be in good repair. Neither 
participants nor spectators assume the risk of defective 
equipment or dangerous facilities. While teachers and 
coaches are not expected to insure the safety of others, 
both participants and spectators should be able to assume 
that the condition of equipment and facilities is safe in 
regard to the intended purpose. 
Four trends emerged from the study. (1) In comparison 
with the 13 equipment cases, the larger number of 48 
facility cases is significant. (2) The number of reported 
cases based on the doctrine of governmental immunity did 
not decrease through the years as was anticipated, but 
remained relatively constant within and aoross the decades. 
(3) The number of equipment and facility cases does not 
seem to support the observation that America is becoming an 
increasingly litigious society. (4) Generally, neither 
age, role, sex of the injured party, nor the sport or 
activity within whioh the injury ooourred would appear 
to influence the decision of the court. Court deoisiona 
consistently have been based on the presenoe or absenoe of 
the four elements necessary to prove negligence and the 
legal principle applied. Only when the defense of 
contributory negligence has been used have the courts 
considered age as a factor. The younger the injured party, 
the less likely the defense of contributory negligence will 
be upheld. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION I 
More injuries occur in the gymnasium and adjoining 
playing fields than in any other area of the school 
environment. Many school-related injuries in athletic, 
physical education, and intramural programs are the result 
of unavoidable accidents. Injuries to students are not 
purely accidental, however, if they are foreseeable and are 
caused by an educator's negligence. 
Since most lawsuits involving physical educators and 
coaches are brought because of injuries, reduction of 
injuries should cause a reduction in the number of such 
lawsuits (Arnold, 1983). Teachers and coaches are not 
expected to insure the safety of students and spectators, 
but they are expected to anticipate and avoid unreasonable 
risks of injury as well as to provide safe equipment and 
facilities. Failure to do so may result in alleged 
negligence. 
The American law of negligence is based primarily on 
precedent established by previous judicial decisions. An 
analysis of reported American law cases involving injuries 
to participants and spectators in which the use, layout, 
said maintenance of equipment and facilities were alleged as 
the proximate cause of the injury should reveal information 
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necessary for the conduct of athletic, physical education, 
and intramural programs designed to minimize the 
possibility of injury. The knowledge and understanding 
engendered by this analysis can be used to help physical 
educators and coaches avoid being found liable for injuries 
because they will be aware of the care which must be taken 
to avoid injuries to participants and spectators and will 
be more knowledgeable about the nature of unsafe conditions 
in the gymnasium and surrounding fields. 
Statement of the Problem 
The major purpose of this study is to examine and 
analyze published court decisions in the United States in 
which the condition of equipment and facilities was alleged 
as the proximate cause of injuries to participants and 
spectators in selected school programs. Such information 
can provide physical educators and coaches with appropriate 
information to make decisions regarding equipment and 
facilities which will minimize the possibility of injury. 
A practical purpose of the study is to provide information 
which educators can utilize to conduct safer programs and 
thus decrease their involvement in litigation. 
More specifically, in the context of litigation 
involving allegations of negligence, six questions have 
been formulated to guide the study: 
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1. What have the courts said regarding the condition 
of equipment in athletic, physical education, and 
intramural programs? 
2. Are there specific trends which can be determined 
from the examination and analysis of the court 
cases regarding equipment? 
3. Based on established case precedent, what are 
practical guidelines which educators can use when 
making decisions about equipment? 
4. What have the courts said regarding the condition 
of facilities in athletic, physical education, and 
intramural programs? 
5. Are there specific trends which can be determined 
from the examination and analysis of the court 
cases regarding facilities? 
6. Based on established case precedent, what are 
practical guidelines which educators can use when 
making decisions about facilities? 
Definition <?f Terms 
The following terms are defined as they were used in 
this study. The terms defined appear in the title of the 
study. Legal terms which are discussed at length in the 
context of negligence and governmental immunity in Chapter 
II are omitted deliberately in this section. 
Athletic Program. An organised, school-sponsored 
sport program for highly skilled individuals characterised 
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by regularly scheduled practices, conducted by a qualified 
coach, and by regularly scheduled contests with other 
schools. 
Condition. The status or state of being of equipment 
and facilities including their use, layout, and 
maintenance. 
Equipment. "Furnishings, or outfit for the required 
purposes; the articles comprised in an outfit" (Black, 
1979, p. 483). 
Facilities. "Something built or installed to perform 
some particular function" (Black, 1979, p. 531). 
Intramural Program. An organized, school-sponsored 
program consisting of sport, recreation, and athletic 
activities for all students attending that school. 
Participant. One who is (a) an officially recognized 
member of an activity class or sport team or (b) a 
physically active participant in the activity or sport. 
The term "participant" includes players, teachers, coaches, 
managers, and officials (McGee v. Board of Education of 
City of New York, 1962). 
Physical Education Program. That part of the school 
instructional program in which students are taught skill 
and knowledge competencies in sport and physical 
activities. 
Proximate Cause. "The primary cause, or that which in 
a natural continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient 
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intervening cause, produces injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred" (Black, 1979, p. 1103). 
School. Public and private elementary and secondary 
schools and institutions of higher learning. 
School-Sponsored Sport Programs. Physical activities 
and sports sponsored by an educational institution and 
limited to athletic, physical education, and intramural 
programs. This term is used throughout the remainder of 
the study to encompass athletic, physical education, and 
intramural programs as defined previously. 
Spectator. One who attends an activity or contest as 
an observer. 
Scope and LimitatiQns Qf frhe Study 
This is an analytical, interpretative study of 
selected reported legal cases in the United States. As 
such, this study includes all tort liability cases from 
1909, the year of the first reported case, through 1984 in 
which the condition of equipment and facilities was alleged 
as the proximate cause of injuries in school-sponsored 
sport programs. Schools in this context encompass grades 
K-12 and college level. Cases sent back to a lower court 
for a determination on the merits of the case have been 
excluded. Cases involving unsponsored use of equipment and 
facilities to which the public has access also have been 
excluded. 
The selection of court cases involving equipment has 
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been made primarily on the basis of teachers' and coaches' 
responsibilities for the condition of such equipment. 
Manufacturers share responsibilities for the condition of 
3afe equipment with these educators. Recent cases have 
focused attention on the liability of manufacturers for 
personal injuries to users of their sport products (Arnold, 
1983). This study is limited to the responsibilities of 
school personnel. 
The selection of court cases involving facilities has 
been made primarily on the basis of school personnel's 
responsibilities for the condition of such facilities. 
Cases analysed involve the decisions and procedures 
necessary for the sound use of existing facilities rather 
than the design and construction of new facilities. 
'Methods and Sources of Information 
The basic research technique was the analysis of 
published cases. All reported United States court cases in 
which the condition of equipment and facilities in 
school-sponsored sport programs was alleged as the 
proximate cause of injury have been located and analysed. 
No other study of this nature has been reported in 
Dissertation Abstracts International. The search in the 
Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) also 
yielded no such study, but provided possible sources for 
related information. 
Primary sources for the study were reported court 
7 
cases. The Century. Decennial, and General editions of the 
American Digest System were used to locate cases related to 
the topic. The National Reporter System and numerous state 
reports were utilized to examine and analyze appropriate 
cases. 
Secondary sources included Shepard's United States 
Citations which was used to determine whether the original 
case has been cited in subsequent cases and whether it has 
been disapproved, modified, or reversed. Other secondary 
sources included the legal encyclopedias American 
Jurisprudence I. II. Ill (Am.Jur.) and Corpus Juris 
Secundum (C.J.S.}, annotations in the American Law Reports 
I. II. Ill (A.L.R.), and the hornbook for tort liability 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts. Sources utilized 
for background material included the Education Index; Index 
to Legal Periodicals; gurrent Law Imtex; Ye^rbQQk Qf ScfrPQl 
Law as well as other books on school law; books and 
articles on the legal aspects of sport, physical education, 
and athletics; also dissertations and periodicals. 
Significance of the Study 
Numerous cases involving defective equipment and 
unsafe facilities in school-sponsored sport programs have 
been litigated since 1909. The frequency with which such 
cases occur may be expected to increase since America has 
become an increasingly litigious society (Appenzeller, 
1978; Arnold, 1983; Nygaard & Boone, 1981). A compilation 
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and analysis of court cases involving teachers' and 
coaches' practices in regard to equipment and facilities 
should result in increased knowledge of what the legal 
precedents and requirements are in this area. 
Presently, information in sport literature which deals 
with the appropriate use of equipment and facilities is 
limited. Although there are sport and physical education 
texts with chapters which focus on equipment and facilities 
(Appenseller & Appenseller, 1980; Arnold, 1983; Nygaard & 
Boone, 1981), often the discussion of equipment and 
facilities is couched among other areas of concern such as 
classifying by ability, establishing and following course 
syllabi, establishing rules for program conduct, 
supervising activities, and many others (Appenzeller, 1975; 
Dougherty & Bonanno, 1979; Van Der Smissen, 1968). 
In addition to sport and physical education texts, 
there are legal annotations which discuss decisions of 
court cases involving accidents and injuries in school 
physical education and athletic programs. However, none of 
these annotations focuses specifically on accidents and 
injuries occurring as a result of the condition of 
equipment and facilities in school-sponsored programs. 
Rather, equipment and facilities usually are included 
under much broader discussions such as accidents in schools 
due to the condition of buildings, equipment, and outside 
premises (Annot. 34 A.L.R.3d 1166; Annot. 35 A.L.R.3d 975) 
and injuries due to the condition of grounds, walks, and 
playgrounds (Annot. 37 A.L.R.3d 738). 
Two annotations (Annot. 36 A.L.R.3d 361; Annot. 35 
A.L.R.3d 725) discuss accidents in physical education and 
athletic events, respectively, but neither includes cases 
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity nor considers 
injuries to participants and spectators in school-sponsored 
sport programs by program, age, role, sex, and sport or 
activity. Yet, it has been estimated that half of the 
accidents which occur in school-sponsored sport programs 
are related to the safety or condition of equipment and 
facilities (Bronsan, 1977). A concentrated review of 
judicial decisions in published cases should provide 
information which will enable teachers and coaches to take 
precautions based upon information about what has been 
found to be unsafe. 
This study is significant in that it provides 
educators with a comprehensive analysis of judicial 
decisions from which positive action regarding equipment 
and facilities may be taken. Guidelines derived from the 
analysis of these decisions may aid in the reduction of 
injuries and in the number of physical educators and 
coaches involved in litigation. 
Procedures 
The questions formulated to guide the study were 
answered following the examination and analysis of relevant 
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cases in which equipment and facilities in school-sponsored 
sport programs were alleged as the proximate cause of 
injury. An attempt was made to extract seven elements from 
each case: 
1. The program in which the injury occurred. 
2. The age of the injured party. 
3. The role of the injured party. 
4. The sex of the injured party. 
5. The sport or activity. 
6. The legal principle involved. 
7. The legal precedent established. 
These were considered the most significant elements for 
answering the questions. Following is a brief discussion 
of why these elements were selected: 
Program. The number of cases reported in any one of 
the school-sponsored sport programs (athletics, physical 
education, or intramurals) was noted to determine whether 
cases were more prevalant in one of the three programs. 
Additionally, consideration was given to whether the courts 
specified different standards of care for each of the three 
programs. 
Age. The age of the injured party was considered to 
determine whether the courts ruled differently if the 
individual were younger or older but other circumstances 
were similar. For the purposes of this study, "younger" is 
considered to be junior high school level or below; "older" 
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is anyone beyond that level. Teachers and coaches may need 
to meet different criteria to provide safe equipment and 
facilities for younger individuals. 
Originally, consideration was given to designating 
children 13 years old and below as "younger" (junior high 
school level and below) and those 14 and above as "older". 
However, this procedure was altered for two reasons: (a) 
court cases often describe children as students in 
elementary, junior high school, high school, or college (in 
contrast with giving specific ages), and (b) there is a 
lack of consistency nationwide among school systems to 
adhere to a standard entry age and level designation for 
students. 
Role. The role of the injured party was considered to 
determine whether the courts ruled differently if the 
individual were a participant or spectator. This role was 
considered to determine whether different standards of care 
are required for participants than for spectators. 
Sex. The sex of the injured party was considered to 
determine whether the courts ruled differently if the 
individual were male or female but other circumstances were 
similar. Additionally, the sex of the injured party was 
considered to determine whether reported court cases 
involved one sex more frequently than the other. 
Sport or Activity. The sport or activity in which the 
injury occurred was considered to identify those in which 
equipment and facilities have been alleged as the proximate 
cause of the injury in school-sponsored sport programs. As 
with the age element, background information provided the 
basis for modification of the final definition of this 
element. 
Originally, the intent was to identify not only the 
sport or activity, but the degree of risk involved in that 
sport or activity. However, classifying individual sports 
and activities as "high risk" and "low risk" proved 
impossible. 
Risk involves a nebulous element of danger (Arnold, 
1983) and the possibility of suffering harm or loss (Elkow, 
1977; Damron, 1977). Although the key element appears to 
be the potential for danger or harm, there is little 
consistency in classifying activities as to their degree 
of risk. 
Three methods of assessing risks in school-sponsored 
sport programs have been identified: (a) examination of 
accident reports to determine whether particular types of 
injuries occur more frequently in particular sports, 
(b) classification of sports by the extent to which they 
may produce injuries, and (c) analysis of court cases to 
determine the legal boundaries of risks. No one of these 
three nor the three in combination provides a suitable 
means of defining "high risk" and "low risk" sports and 
activities. 
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Although it is possible to develop a list of likely 
injuries in particular sports by using accident reports, 
this method has its disadvantages. First, such a list must 
by tested against a large number of cases to be valid 
(Ryan, 1975), and accurate information is lacking in this 
area (Elkow, 1977). Second, accident data are accumulated 
after the fact and often are outdated due to the resistance 
of sport leaders to complete and analyse accident reports 
in a consistent manner (Arnheim, 1985; Damron, 1977; Ryan, 
1975). 
Classifying sports by the extent to which they may be 
expected to produce accidents and injuries has resulted in 
sports being classified as "collision", "contact", and 
"noncontaot". Collision sports in this classification are 
considered to be those having "more potential for causing 
fatalities and severe injuries than sports categorized as 
contact or noncontaot" (Arnheim, 1985, p. 11). Although 
no definition of either contact or noncontaot sports has 
been located, tentative listings of sports categorised as 
contact include basketball, baseball, field hockey, touch 
and flag football, judo, lacrosse, rodeo, soccer, softball, 
water polo, wrestling (Arnheim, 1985), water skiing and 
snow skiing (Ryan, 1977). Similarly, sports classified as 
noncontaot include archery, badminton, bowling, 
cross-country running, curling, fencing, golf, gymnastics, 
riflery, skiing, squash, swimming and diving, tennis, track 
and field, and volleyball (Arnheim, 1985). An examination 
of these lists highlights a major disadvantage of this 
method. Obtaining agreement from sport experts about how a 
particular sport should be classified is difficult. Skiing 
(both water and snow), for example, is classified as both 
contact and noncontact. Second, if collision sports have 
more potential for severe injury than contact or noncontact 
sports, the tendency may be to consider these two latter 
categories of sports as having fewer risks of severe 
injury. Yet, severe injuries can and do occur, for 
example, in gymnastics and swimming which are classified as 
noncontact. Furthermore, as Nygaard and Boone (1981) 
clearly stated, "no two activities have the same risks. 
Every sport has inherent risks, but these risks differ not 
only among sports but also within a sport if it is taught 
in different areas or to different grades or skill levels" 
(P. 50). 
Analysis of decisions rendered by the judiciary in 
cases involving alleged negligence of teachers and coaches 
is another method which may be used to assess risks in 
school-sponsored sport programs. F. L. Allman (personal 
communication, April 17, 1985), Dougherty and Downs (1981), 
and Van Der Smissen (1975) all sugested that analysis of 
case law shows no activities, except boxing, to be 
inherently dangerous. Judges and juries tend to focus 
their attention on proper and safe conduct of the activity 
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or programs (F. L. Allman, personal communication, 
April 17, 1985; N. J. Dougherty, personal communication, 
April 18, 1985; Dougherty & Downs, 1981; Nygaard & Boone, 
1981; Van Der Smissen, 1975). Analysis of court cases also 
reveals that teachers and coaches must be alert to the 
potential risks of an activity and the potential injuries 
which may result from participation in that activity 
(Arnold, 1983; Nygaard & Boone, 1981). When teachers and 
coaches have identified these potential risks, they then 
can examine the equipment and facilities involved with that 
particular activity to "eliminate the likelihood of injury 
due to a risk not present in the activity" (Nygaard & 
Boone, 1981, p. 45). 
In the context of this study then, it appears that 
legally no school-sponsored sport is considered inherently 
dangerous. Teachers and coaches, however, do need to be 
aware of potential risks in an activity and potential 
injuries which may result from participation in that 
activity. 
Legal Principle. The legal principle was considered 
to determine the rule or doctrine which furnished the basis 
for the decision rendered. The legal principle the court 
applied in adjudicating the case also was considered to 
assist the investigator in determining trends in the 
reported cases involving equipment and facilities. 
Legal Precedent. The rule or legal precedent the case 
established was considered also to assist the investigator 
in determining trends in the reported cases involving 
equipment and facilities. Such trends should alert school 
personnel to specific aspects of equipment and facilities 
which require attention. 
In addition to the seven elements described 
previously, other pertinent information was extracted from 
the cases. A coding sheet was developed to assist in 
obtaining this information (Appendix A). For each case, 
the proximate cause of the injury, condition of the 
equipment or facility, and program in which the injury 
occured were identified. To assist the investigator in 
analysing each case, the issue, facts, principal defendant, 
and decision of the court were determined. When 
appropriate, special circumstances of a specific case or 
personal impression relating to the decision were noted to 
enrich the discussion. 
Design of the Study 
After the introduction (Chapter I), the study is 
divided into five major parts. Chapter II contains 
background information regarding legal concepts which are 
essential for understanding the decisions rendered in court 
cases dealing with equipment and facilities. In addition, 
this chapter includes information which should assist the 
investigator in deriving guidelines from these decisions. 
Material in this chapter is organised in two major 
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sections: (a) negligence and (b) governmental immunity. 
Each section concludes with a summary. 
The third chapter contains a review and narrative 
discussion of cases which have arisen from unsafe 
conditions of equipment. This chapter is organized in six 
major sections. The first three sections include (a) court 
cases related to athletic programs, (b) court cases related 
to physical education programs, and (c) court cases related 
to intramural programs. Age, role, sex, sport or activity, 
legal principle, and legal precedent are discussed in each 
section. The fourth section includes a summary of the 
analyses of cases in the three school-sponsored sport 
programs. The fifth section includes trends which were 
identified from the cases presented. In the final section, 
guidelines derived from reported cases are presented for 
school personnel. This chapter addresses Questions 1, 2, 
and 3 in the Problem Statement. 
Chapter IV contains a review and narrative discussion 
of cases which have arisen from unsafe conditions of 
facilities. This chapter is organized in six major 
sections: (a) court cases related to athletic programs, 
(b) court cases related to physical education programs, and 
(c) court cases related to intramural programs. Age, role, 
sex, sport or activity, legal principle and legal precedent 
are discussed in each section. The fourth section includes 
a summary of the analyses of cases in the three school-
sponsored sport programs. The fifth section includes 
trends which were identified from the cases presented. The 
sixth section presents guidelines derived from the reported 
cases. This chapter addresses Questions 4, 5, and 6. 
Chapter V, the final chapter, contains a review and 
summary of information obtained from an analysis of the 
reported court cases. The questions asked in the 
introduction and addressed in Chapters III and IV are 
summarized. 
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CHAPTER II 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEGLIGENCE AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
The area of law which addresses liability is known as 
tort law. Liability is a legal responsibility, "the state 
of one who is bound by law or justice to do something" 
(Black, 1979, p. 823). A tort is "a civil wrong, other 
than breach of contract, for which the court will provide 
a remedy in the form of damages" (Keeton et al., 1984, 
p. 2). A tort is different from a crime. A crime involves 
an offense against the public in which the state brings 
proceedings in the form of criminal prosecution. Remedies 
for a tort, on the other hand, involve civil action 
initiated and maintained by an injured individual for 
compensation for damages suffered. 
Tort law defines a particular level of conduct that 
the law recognizes individuals owe one another (Thurston, 
1983). Negligence is the most common tort and has 
developed into the dominant cause of action for accidental 
injury in the United States (Hazard, 1978; Keeton et al., 
1984; Thurston, 1983). Teachers and coaches need to 
understand negligence since more school-related accidents 
and injuries occur in the gymnasium and adjoining playing 
fields than in any other area of the school environment. 
Historically, governmental agencies including school 
20 
districts have not been liable for negligence because of 
the common law concept of sovereign immunity or 
governmental immunity. Such immunity, however, has been 
modified substantially as a result of court decisions 
rendered over the years. 
This chapter is organised in two major sections. The 
first section focuses on the elements which constitute 
negligence and the defenses which may be used in cases of 
alleged negligence. The rationale for the doctrine of 
governmental immunity, legislative and judicial provisions 
which have altered the doctrine, as well as the current 
status of the doctrine in the United States are discussed 
in the second section. Each of the two sections concludes 
with a brief summary. 
Negligence 
Some injuries are the result of unavoidable accidents 
which cannot be foreseen or prevented by exercising 
reasonable care. Consequently, there is no liability for 
injuries resulting from such accidents. Other injuries 
may be caused by a person's negligence in allowing or not 
preventing the occurrence of an injury. Negligence is 
"conduct which falls below a standard established by law 
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm" (Keeton et al., 1984, p. 169), and may involve 
either acts of commission or omission. 
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Elements of Negligence 
The courts do not hold teachers, coaches, and other 
educators responsible for all injuries which occur. 
However, these individuals may be held liable for those 
injuries which occur as the result of their own negligence, 
either directly or by imputation. For negligence to be 
proven, the injured party must show that four elements 
exist. In the absence of any one of the following 
elements, there is no cause of action for negligence: 
(a) a duty of due care, (b) a breach of that duty, 
(c) causation, and (d) actual damages. 
Duty of due care. The concept of due care is a 
legally imposed standard of conduct to which a person must 
conform to protect others from unreasonable risks. The 
courts have addressed this standard of conduct by creating 
a fictitious person—the "reasonable man of ordinary 
prudence". Sometimes this person is described as a 
reasonable person, a person of ordinary prudence, or a 
person of reasonable prudence. Regardless of the 
terminology used, an individual has a legal duty to act 
as an ordinary, prudent, reasonable person would in the 
same circumstances. 
The duty of care to protect another person from 
injury may be imposed by statutes, administrative rules or 
regulations, or by judicial decisions known collectively as 
the common law (57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence §36, 1971). 
Historically, schools have been held to a duty of 
reasonable care to provide a safe place for their students 
Thus, boards of education have the duty to maintain the 
premises, playground equipment, and facilities in a 
reasonably safe condition (Howell v. Union Free School 
Dist.. 1937) and provide reasonable supervision for the 
safety of students (Reynolds v. State. 1955). 
Teachers also have a duty to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of students engaged in school-related 
activities. A classic statement of the duty teachers owe 
their students is found in Hoose v. Drumm (1939): 
Teachers have watched over the play of their pupils 
time out of mind. At recess periods, not less than 
in the class room, a teacher owes it to his charges 
to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary 
prudence would observe in comparable circumstances 
(P. 234). 
Due care also requires conduct of teachers and coaches 
which is reasonable in light of their superior knowledge, 
training, experience, and any special skills they may 
possess. As professionals, physical educators and coaches 
are held to a higher degree of care than that expected of 
ordinarily prudent but untrained persons. The behavior of 
physical educators and coaches will be assessed in 
comparison with what would be expected of a reasonable 
professional in their field (65 C.J.S. Negligence §11(4), 
1966; Collingsworth, 1983). 
The standard of reasonable care is based on what is 
usual and customary in the profession (Keeton et al., 
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1984). For a particular sport or activity, the standard 
is affected by the local or national standard for that 
sport or activity. The standard changes over time and is 
affected by technology and standards set by professionals 
in the field. 
A physical educator or coach is expected to act as a 
reasonable and prudent physical educator or coach would 
in planning and conducting activities, supervising 
students, instructing on the proper use of equipment and 
facilities, and warning students of dangers or risks in 
school-sponsored sport programs. Also, the degree of care 
expected of a teacher or coach will be measured in light 
of the danger involved and the age, maturity, and 
experience of the students. Greater care is expected in 
the supervision of younger children and particularly in 
those areas of the school which are considered to be more 
dangerous—shop, chemistry, physical education classes, 
and athletic participation (57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence 
§§70, 89, 1971). Consequently, the younger and less 
experienced the child, the greater the precautions required 
by the teacher or coach to avoid unreasonable risk to the 
child. 
While a teacher or coach has a legal duty to conform 
to a certain standard of conduct to protect students in 
school-sponsored sport programs, no such relationship 
exists in other situations. For example, a physical 
educator who teaches swimming and coaches the swimming 
team at a local high school and is enjoying a week end 
outing at a local public beach has no duty to attempt the 
rescue of a drowning child. While some may impute a moral 
obligation on the part of the educator, there is no legal 
obligation. 
Breach of duty. A breach of duty involves failure 
on the person's part to conform to the standard required. 
A breach of duty may involve either an act of commission 
or omission. When a person performs an act that fails to 
conform to the standard of care, an act of commission has 
occurred. Similarly, when a person fails to take 
appropriate action to reach or maintain the expected 
standard of care, an act of omission has occurred. 
Scott v. State (1956) is a case demonstrating a 
breach of duty. A right-fielder in an intercollegiate 
baseball game was seriously injured when he collided with 
a metal flag pole located within the playing field. Since 
a reasonably prudent person could have foreseen that a 
fielder running to catch a long fly ball would direct his 
attention primarily on the ball, the court held that the 
State of New York was negligent in its maintenance of the 
baseball field. The college breached its duty by failing 
to conform to the expected standard of care. 
Teachers and coaches may breach their duty, for 
example, by allowing defective equipment to be used, 
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failing to repair equipment, altering equipment once it 
has been purchased, failing to follow the manufacturer's 
instructions for assembling equipment, and failing to warn 
adequately of potential risks related to the use of 
equipment. These examples illustrate not only several ways 
in which educators may breach their duty, but also include 
actions which may involve teachers and coaches in sport 
product litigation. 
Causation. There must be a reasonably close causal 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
resulting injury. The term "proximate cause" or "legal 
cause" is used to connote such causal connection. For 
causation to exist, the injured person (plaintiff) must 
show that the injury was a direct and foreseeable result 
of the conduct of the defendant with no intervening act 
occurring. If the defendant could not reasonably have 
foreseen potentially dangerous consequences of actions (or 
inactions), there is no negligence and, therefore, no 
liability. In order to establish liability, one must 
first establish negligence. 
A rule derived by the courts to ascertain causation 
is known as the "but for" rule. The defendant's conduct 
is not a cause of the injury if the injury would have 
occurred without it (Keeton et al., 1984). In other 
words, "but for" the defendant's conduct, the injury would 
not have occurred. 
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A person may be negligent and yet not liable if an 
intervening act occurs. An intervening act is an 
independent, unforeseeable act by a third party which 
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury. Generally, 
such an intervening act breaks the chain of causation 
between the prior wrong and the injury, and relieves the 
original wrongdoer from liability (57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence 
§209, 1971; 65 C.J.S. Negligence §111(1), 1966). 
Although not a sport or physical education case, 
Frace v. Long Beach City High School Dist. (1943) provides 
a good example of an intervening cause in a school setting. 
Two high school students stole chemicals from the unlocked 
chemical supply room at the high school and took them home. 
After observing the two boys experiment with the chemicals, 
the plaintiff asked one of them if he could use the 
chemicals for an experiment. When the plaintiff mixed the 
chemicals in a container and shook them, the solution 
exploded causing his injuries. The act of the students 
stealing the chemicals and giving them to the plaintiff 
broke the chain of causation between the injury and any 
negligence of the school in supervision of the storeroom. 
Actual damages. There must be an actual loss or 
real damages in order for someone to be held liable for 
negligence. If the concurrent negligence of two or more 
individuals results in am injury to a third person, the 
defendants may be found to be jointly and severally liable 
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under which circumstances the plaintiff may recover from 
either or all defendant(s) (65 C.J.S. Negligence §102, 
1966). 
In regard to negligence, the term "damages" indicates 
the sum of money which the law awards or imposes for an 
injury to a person injured by the tort of another 
(22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §1, 1965; Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §902, 1979). In personal injury cases in which the 
defendant was negligent, recovery for damages usually is 
for lost time, decrease in future earning capacity, 
medical services, and pain and suffering (22 Am.Jur.2d 
Damages §86, 1965). 
The amount to be awarded is usually for the jury to 
determine in view of the facts and circumstances of each 
case. Generally, the jury considers such things as the 
age, health, habits, and pursuits of the plaintiff 
(22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §86, 1965). The reviewing courts 
then determine whether the damages awarded are excessive 
or inadequate (22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §109, 1965). 
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff who alleges the 
negligent conduct of another to prove each of the elements 
of negligence. If the plaintiff fails to demonstrate, or 
the defendant sets forth facts which tend to show that 
the plaintiff cannot or has not met the burden of showing 
each element by the preponderance of the evidence, then 
negligence will not be shown. 
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Defenses for EtegUaen<?e 
Educators are not the insurers of students' safety. 
Some injuries will occur in school-sponsored sport programs 
notwithstanding the use of necessary care, regulations, 
and safety equipment (Reynolds v. State. 1955). In 
Reynolds. a 16-year-old high school student was injured in 
a physical education class while learning a wrestling 
maneuver. The student had received adequate instruction 
in wrestling during the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth 
grades. He had been adequately supervised by an 
experienced and competent instructor when the injury 
occurred, and the teacher had tried to match wrestlers 
with partners of comparable ability. The court held that 
there was no negligence since the state had fulfilled its 
duty to exercise reasonable care by employing an 
experienced, competent teacher who had used the judgment 
of a reasonable man and committed no act of negligence. 
Even if it has been established that the defendant's 
conduct has in fact been a cause of the plaintiff's 
injury, the question remains as to whether the defendant 
legally can be held responsible for the injury. The 
defendant may attempt to demonstrate that the four elements 
discussed previously were not present and, consequently, 
there was no negligence. Keeton et al. (1984) cited four 
other defenses for negligence: (a) contributory 
negligence, (b) last clear chance, (c) comparative 
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negligence, and (d) assumption of risk. 
Contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is 
a viable defense when both the defendant and the plaintiff 
fail to meet fully the required standard of care expected 
of each. As of 1983, only Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia (Keeton et al., 1984) 
still retained contributory negligence as a complete 
defense. In these 10 states, no damages are awarded 
because the plaintiff's actions contributed in some way, 
however minor, to the injury. As is expected of the 
defendant, the plaintiff also is required to conform to 
the objective standard of conduct expected of the 
reasonable person of ordinary prudence in like 
circumstances. 
Minors generally are held to a standard of conduct 
appropriate to children. The standard required for 
children is that degree of care which children of similar 
age, intelligence, and experience would exercise under the 
same circumstances. In every other respect, the elements 
needed to prove contributory negligence are the same as 
for negligence. 
According to Keeton et al. (1984), courts in 
approximately 12 states have held that children below the 
age of 7 arbitrarily are considered incapable of 
contributory negligence since they do not understand the 
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degree of care which must be exercised to save themselves 
from injury. Likewise, according to these authors, a 
number of courts have held that children between the ages 
of 7 and 14 are presumed to be incapable, but may be shown 
to be capable. Above age 14 children are presumed to be 
capable, but may be shown to be incapable. Originally, 
these seven-year multiples were derived from the Bible, 
but such age classifications have been acknowledged as too 
fixed and arbitrary (Keeton et al., 1984). In fact, many 
courts have rejected these age limits, and some have 
ruled that even children under 7 can be capable of 
negligent conduct. 
There appears to be no consistency among courts in 
adhering to standard age ranges. It does appear, however, 
that the younger the child, the more difficult it is to 
prove contributory negligence. 
In Juntila v. Everett School Dist. No 24 (1935), the 
court held that 18-year-old William Juntila was 
contributorily negligent in the fall he sustained from the 
bleachers at a high school football game. He and several 
other spectators sat on the top railing of the bleachers 
causing the railing to give way under their weight. Since 
Juntila was "18 years of age, of mature judgment, and 
fully able to appreciate the risk he took in sitting upon 
the railing" (p. 616), he contributed to his injury when he 
sat on an area of the bleachers not intended as a seat. 
Last olear chance. Even though one accepted 
modification of the strict rule of contributory negligence 
is the doctrine of last clear chance, Keeton et al. (1984) 
maintained that this doctrine has been the subject of much 
controversy. The doctrine had its origin in 1842 in the 
English case of Davies v. Mann and has been nicknamed the 
"jackass doctrine" for obvious reasons. The case involved 
the defendant driving into a donkey which the plaintiff 
had hobbled in the middle of the road. The court ruled 
that even if the plaintiff had been negligent in this 
situation, he still could recover damages since the 
defendant had the last clear chance of avoiding the 
accident. 
The last clear chance doctrine was alleged in 
Chapman v. State (1972). A college freshman was injured 
while performing a "double-forward somersault" on the 
trampoline. The plaintiff had stayed after his physical 
education class to work on the maneuver. At the time of 
the injury, the instructor was working with another 
student at the horizontal bars. Although four spotters 
were required when the trampoline was used during class, 
there was only one when Chapman was injured. Chapman 
claimed that his teacher had the last clear chance to 
prevent the injury. On appeal, the court held that 
Chapman should not have used the trampoline with only one 
spotter and that he, not the instructor, had the 
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opportunity to avoid the injury. 
The last clear chance doctrine apparently resulted 
from concern for the harshness of the contributory 
negligence defense. However, the fundamental fairness of 
the doctrine has been questioned: 
It is not easy to defend a rule which absolves the 
plaintiff entirely of his own negligence, and places 
the whole loss upon the defendant, whose fault may be 
the lesser of the two. The doctrine thus appears to 
be a dying one, particularly in many of the 
jurisdictions which have adopted a comparative fault 
[negligence] (Keeton et al., 1984, p. 468). 
Comparative negligence. Comparative negligence, 
like contributory negligence, is a viable defense when 
both the defendant and the plaintiff can be said to be 
negligent. Unlike contributory negligence where recovery 
is denied if the plaintiff were negligent to any degree, 
the plaintiff under the comparative negligence defense may 
recover a portion of the damages awarded (65A C.J.S. 
Negligence §169, 1966). The recovery depends upon the 
relative fault of the two parties. 
As of 1983, 40 states had enacted comparative 
negligence legislation (Keeton et al., 1984). In those 10 
states (Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Virginia) retaining contributory negligence as a complete 
defense, there is no comparative negligence because the 
plaintiff's own negligence is a complete bar to recovery. 
Conversely, in the 40 comparative negligence states, there 
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is a qualified or partial bar to plaintiff's recovery. 
Assumption of risk. The assumption of risk defense 
is narrowly defined. For assumption of risk to be used as 
a defense, the plaintiff must know, understand, and 
appreciate the nature of the risk and voluntarily choose 
to incur the risk. If the plaintiff is unable to 
comprehend the nature of the risk in a given situation 
because of inadequate information, inexperience, or 
youthfulness, the courts do not accept assumption of risk 
as a defense (Keeton et al., 1984). In Berman v. 
Philadelphia Board of Education (1983), for example, the 
court held that an 11-year-old participant in an intramural 
floor hockey game did not assume any risk by participating 
in the activity even though the school board failed to 
provide protective equipment. "By reason of his tender 
age and lack of intelligence, experience, and information, 
[the plaintiff] did not appreciate the dangers of floor 
hockey..." (p. 550). 
Only the obvious, ordinary risks inherent in the 
sport or activity are assumed by a participant (65A C.J.S. 
Negligence §174(6), 1966). A student who was properly 
supervised and instructed about the dangers of attempting 
a vault over a high horse assumed the risk when he broke 
his arm during the maneuver (Salvers v. Ranger. 1951). 
Similarly, in McGee v. Board of Education of City of New 
York (1962), an assistant baseball coach standing behind 
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the pitcher's mound assumed the risk of being hit by a 
ball thrown from first base to third. The coach had 
volunteered to assist with the team and assumed the risks 
created by the condition of the playing area even though 
the baseball diamond was not regulation size. 
In the assumption of risk defense, the plaintiff is 
barred from recovery only if his choice is voluntary. 
Based on such voluntary choice, it is obvious why this 
defense is used far more often in cases involving athletics 
in comparison with physical education cases in that 
physical education is viewed generally as a required 
subject in the school curriculum. An intercollegiate 
wrestler, however, did not assume the risk of the negligent 
supervision of a referee (Carabba v. Anacortes School 
District No. 103. 1968). The wrestler's opponent applied 
an illegal hold while the referee's attention was 
momentarily diverted. Although the injured athlete 
voluntarily participated in the interscholastic wrestling 
match and knew the possibility for injury existed, he did 
not assume the risk of the official's negligence or 
incompetence. 
As with participants, spectators assume the normal 
risks incidental to the sport or activity. Thus, a 
grandmother watching her grandson play football from the 
sidelines of the field (Perry v. Seattle School Dist. 
No. 1. 1965) and a father watching his son playing during 
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a football scrimmage (Cololough v. Orleans Parish School 
Board. 1964) both assumed the risks involved in being a 
spectator. 
In a number of states, the doctrines of contributory 
negligence, last clear chance, and assumption of risk have 
been abrogated and the comparative negligence doctrine 
adopted either judicially or by statute (65A C.J.S. 
Negligence §169, 1966). 
Summary 
Negligence is conduct which fails to meet a standard 
of law designed to protect others from unreasonable risks 
or harm. Negligence necessarily involves a person's 
failure to meet the required duty, thereby causing injury 
to another. However, if one cannot reasonably foresee 
that one's actions would result in injury or if one's 
actions were reasonable in relation to what could be 
expected, there is no negligence and no liability. 
In addition to the defense of no negligence, four 
basic defenses—contributory negligence, last clear 
chance, comparative negligence, and assumption of risk— 
exist for negligence cases. A number of states have 
adopted some form of comparative negligence to replace the 
doctrines of contributory negligence, last clear chance, 
and assumption of risk. Comparative negligence, therefore, 
is the one remaining defense for negligence in many 
states. It is, however, only a partial defense because 
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both sides will share the responsibility for the damages 
which were incurred. 
Governmental Immunity 
American public schools and institutions of higher 
learning historically have been protected from suits 
seeking damages for school-related injuries to students 
under the common law concept of sovereign immunity. As 
extensions of the state and while performing governmental 
functions, the public schools and institutions of higher 
learning and individuals associated with their conduct 
(school boards, boards of trustees, and boards of regents) 
have enjoyed the same immunity as the sovereign state 
(Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 703, 1970). Similarly, private 
educational institutions have enjoyed immunity under the 
doctrine of charitable immunity (68 Am.Jur.2d Schools 
§319, 1973). When governmental immunity is a bar to 
recovery, it acts as a shield for a governmental entity 
(school board or school district). Teachers and coaches, 
however, traditionally have been personally liable for 
their own negligence (Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1163, 1953). 
Rationale for the Doctrine 
Sovereign immunity, inherited from our English 
ancestors, literally connotes that the "king can do no 
wrong". The concept was expressed as "governmental 
immunity" when it was altered to fit the American 
governmental pattern (O'Reilly & Green, 1983). Under the 
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doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity, the state 
cannot be sued unless it voluntarily agrees to it. This 
doctrine ordinarily extends to every arm or agency of the 
state including school boards (Garber, 1966). 
There are several reasons which support tort 
nonliability of public schools: 
The state is immune from tort liability because of 
its sovereign character. School districts, school 
boards, or similar agencies or authorities, or other 
institutions of higher learning or their governing 
boards likewise partake of this sovereign immunity. 
Public schools have no funds to pay damages for 
tort claims and have no power to raise money for this 
purpose. All funds under their control are 
appropriated by law strictly for school purposes and 
cannot be diverted. 
Public education is for the benefit of all and 
the welfare of the few must be sacrificed in the 
public interest. Diverting school funds to pay 
private damages may impair public education. 
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not 
apply in rendering the school district liable for' 
acts of it officers, agents, or employees who 
commit a tort since the school district could act 
only through such persons. (Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 703, 
1970) 
No school district can waive its immunity and accept 
liability; only the state has the power to make itself or 
its subdivisions liable. 
The 1798 English case Russell v. Men of Devon (cited 
in Martin, 1970) served as precedent for extending the 
state's immunity to towns, counties, cities, and eventually 
school districts. This case involved injury to the 
plaintiff's wagon as a consequence of a bridge not having 
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been repaired. Relying on the decision in Russell (1798), 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled in 1860 that the 
town of Randolph was not liable for injuries to a student 
who fell into a dangerous hole on the school grounds 
(Bigelow v. Inhabitants of Randolph. 1860). 
Other states followed the lead of Massachusetts. By 
1930, 28 states had adopted the rule of governmental 
immunity for school district tort liability (Martin, 
1970). Generally, school districts were absolved from 
liability in those states which had adopted governmental 
immunity. 
Exceptions and Modifications to the Immunity Rule 
From 1930 to 1959, the courts were less likely to 
absolve the school districts from liability. Often such 
court decisions were based on legislative action. In some 
cases, however, courts took the position that they had the 
right to modify the doctrine of governmental immunity in 
the absence of legislative action. The rationale for 
judicial modification of the doctrine was that the courts 
had created the doctrine originally and, therefore, they 
had the right to change it. 
Whether changes have been made by legislative action~ 
or by judicial action, the application of the doctrine of 
governmental immunity has been narrowed considerably. The 
following discussion focuses on the provisions affecting 
governmental immunity which have resulted from legislative 
action and judicial action. 
Legislative provisions. Legislative enactments include 
two primary exceptions to the doctrine of governmental 
immunity. These exceptions are safe-place statutes and 
save-harmless statutes. 
A number of state legislatures have enacted safe-
place statutes. These statutes require that public 
buildings and grounds be kept safe. Recovery is permitted 
from the school district in those instances in which a 
negligence suit alleging unsafe conditions of school 
buildings or grounds results in a favorable ruling for the 
injured party. 
Save-harmless statutes have been enacted to require 
or permit school boards to financially reimburse school 
employees. Such reimbursement is made for losses sustained 
only in cases of negligence when employees were acting 
within the bounds of their employment. These statutes 
still do not permit suits to be brought against the school 
board directly. 
Judicial provisions. The courts, as well as the 
legislatures, have made exceptions to the immunity rule. 
When such exceptions have been made by the courts, 
generally recovery has been allowed in four areas: 
(a) for a tort arising out of the school's engaging in a 
proprietary function as distinguished from a governmental 
function, (b) for personal injury or death caused by the 
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school's creation or maintenance of a nuisance as 
distinguished from ordinary negligence, (c) for injury or 
death caused by wilful and wanton misconduct in causing 
personal injury or death, and (d) for a tort arising out 
of the school's engaging in a ministerial function as 
distinguished from a discretionary function (Annot., 
33 A.L.R.3d 703, 1970). 
A number of courts have ruled that schools performing 
governmental functions are protected by immunity from 
tort liability but do not have such protection when 
engaging in proprietary functions. Governmental functions 
include those directly related to the school's purpose for 
existing as well as those imposed on the school for the 
general welfare of the public. Conversely, proprietary 
functions have no such direct relationship to the school's 
purpose nor are they imposed on the school for the public 
welfare (Arnold, 1983). 
Physical education activities generally have been 
held to be governmental functions (Bartell v. School 
Dist.. 1943; Howard v. Tacoma School Dist.. 1915; Rgad v-
School District No. 211 of Lewis County. 1941). In 
Howard (1915), the court held that the physical development 
of children is a function of the government for the same 
reason that the mental development is a governmental 
function since the state is as interested in the physical 
standard of its citisens as in their mental standard. 
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In contrast with physical education activities, 
athletic events have not consistently been held to be 
governmental functions. In determining whether an athletic 
event is a governmental or proprietary function, the 
question often asked is whether the event is free to 
participants and spectators, whether a nominal or 
incidental fee is charged, or whether profit is made 
(Van Der Smissen, 1968). In Hoffman v. Scranton School 
District (1949), a case in which a spectator was injured 
due to the condition of the facility, the football game to 
which admission had been charged was held to constitute a 
proprietary function. Similarly, in Sawava v. Tucson High 
School District No. 1 (1955), a school district by leasing 
its stadium and charging admission was exercising a 
proprietary function and was liable for injuries sustained 
by a spectator at a football game as a result of its 
negligence in maintenance of the stadium. However, in 
several other cases in which paying spectators were 
allegedly injured due to the condition of the facility in 
basketball, football, and baseball events, the school 
district was immune from tort liability since it was 
performing a governmental function (Reed v. Rhea County. 
1949; Rhoades v. School District No. 9. Roosevelt County. 
1943; Richards v. Birmingham School District of City of 
Birmingham. 1957; Smith v. Hefner. 1952). 
A nuisance is a "dangerous, unsafe, or offensive 
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condition resulting from some act or omission" (Mokovioh 
v. Independent School Dist. of Virginia. No. 22. 1929, 
p. 293) which subjects persons to injury. This condition 
usually exists over a longer period of time than a single 
incidence of negligent conduct. 
In Bush v. Norwalk (1937), a balance beam purchased 
from a leading manufacturer of such equipment, used 
throughout the schools in the city, and considered standard 
equipment, constituted a nuisance in an injury sustained 
by an 8-year-old student when he fell from the beam. The 
slippery beam on an oily floor constituted a "continuing 
condition the natural tendency of which was to create 
danger and to inflict injury upon all children using it 
and that, as a matter of fact, a nuisance was created by 
the use of the beam upon the floor" (p. 609). 
Wilful and wanton misconduct is an act which exhibits 
reckless disregard for the safety of others. Such conduct 
involves failure to use ordinary care to prevent an injury 
when one is knowledgeable of impending danger or failure to 
discover the danger through one's carelessness. Wilful and 
wanton misconduct is distinguished from negligence. The 
term "negligence" denotes the opposite of the term "wilful 
misconduct" in that absence of intent is a distinguishing 
characteristic of negligence whereas wilfulness involves 
actual or implied intent (65 C.J.S.Negligence §9(1), 1966). 
Likewise, mere inadvertence may constitute negligence 
whereas "wantonness" is essentially "a state of mind which 
includes the elements of consciousness of one's conduct, 
intent to do the act, realisation of the probability of 
injury, and reckless disregard of consequences" (65 C.J.S. 
Negligence §9(1), 1966, p. 547). 
In Landers v. School District No. 203 (1978), a high 
school physical education teacher was found guilty of 
wilful and wanton misconduct. The misconduct involved 
directing a student to perform a backward somersault even 
though the student was obese, was afraid to try the stunt, 
and had told the teacher that she did not know how to 
perform the stunt and had been hurt trying it as a young 
child. 
Whether the act or omission which caused an injury 
was related to ministerial or discretionary duties of 
a school system has been the primary focus of some court 
cases. Discretionary duties include those at the 
policy-making level, e.g., the act involves judgment, 
personal deliberation, discretion, and choices among 
possible courses of action or inaction (Annot., 33A.L.R.3d 
703, 1970; Van Der Smissen, 1968). Discretionary acts are 
protected by governmental immunity. Ministerial acts, on 
the other hand, are those which involve the implementation 
of policy and are performed according to explicit 
directions prescribed by some higher authority or statute, 
e.g., acts which are absolute, certain, and involve a set 
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task in which the employee is left no choice of his own 
(Van Der Smissen, 1986). Ministerial acts are not shielded 
by governmental immunity. The rationale for this 
distinction is the fear that if one can be sued for wrong 
judgments, one's decision-making will be hampered. 
Fustin v. Board of Education (1968) provides a good 
example of a school district being held not liable for the 
discretionary judgment of a coach. In Fustin. a basketball 
player was struck in the face by another player, and the 
injured plaintiff alleged negligence of the coach in 
permitting an aggressive player to participate. The 
reasoning of the court was that the coach, as a public 
decision-maker, should be shielded from liability since 
his choices or decisions should be made without fear of 
liability or the second guessing of the courts and juries. 
A physical education teacher conducting a junior high 
school physical education class was performing a 
ministerial duty in Larson v. Independent School District 
(1980). While attempting a headspring over a rolled mat, 
a student broke his neck. The injured plaintiff alleged 
that his teacher had not used progressive activities 
leading up to the headspring and that the teacher had not 
been spotting properly at the time of the injury. In 
ruling for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
commented: 
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The manner in which [the teacher] chose to spot the 
headspring did not involve a decision on the policy­
making level. Once he decided to require [the 
plaintiff] and others in his class to perform the 
headspring, it was [the teacher's] responsibility 
to see that the headspring was safely taught and 
properly spotted. [The teacher's] decision to spot 
the headspring in the manner he chose was a decision 
made on the operational level of conduct and clearly 
involved a ministerial duty. Similarly, the improper 
teaching of the headspring essentially involved a 
ministerial function (p. 120). 
Current Status of Governmental Immunity 
The concept of governmental immunity originally 
established in Russell v. Men of Devon in 1798 was reversed 
a century later in England, but the concept continued to 
prevail in America until the middle of the 20th century. 
Prior to 1959, only three states—Washington (1907), 
New York (1907), and California (1928)—had abolished the 
immunity rule (Martin, 1970). From 1959 to present, state 
after state followed the lead established in Molitor v. 
Kaneland Community School (1959) and moved toward setting 
aside governmental immunity. In Molitor (1959), the 
Supreme Court of Illinois noted that the continued 
prevalence of the immunity rule in the United States 
resulted in no protection for American citisens when they 
were injured as a result of negligent acts of governmental 
entities. The court ruled that arguments supporting 
governmental immunity were out of phase with the times and 
reversed the decision of the lower court by ruling for 
Thomas Molitor, who had been injured in a school bus 
accident. 
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To date, 14 states have abrogated the doctrine of 
governmental immunity by judicial action, generally by the 
state supreme court (Appendix B). Thirty states have 
included constitutional provisions or have enacted statutes 
to change the common law of governmental immunity 
(Appendix C). In those states which have abrogated the 
doctrine of governmental immunity or modified it in regard 
to public schools, an injury proximately caused by the 
negligence of a school employee may result in liability 
against the school district. In those states retaining 
immunity, there can be no liability on the part of the 
school district unless the immunity has been waived to 
the extent of insurance coverage or if the plaintiff's 
case fits under one of the exceptions to the general rule 
of immunity discussed previously. In conforming to the 
abrogation of governmental immunity, many states have 
dealt similarly with charitable immunity. 
Even though some states have provided teachers and 
coaches with protection by passing save-harmless laws, the 
prevailing condition is that these educators are qualified 
professionals who are responsible for the consequences of 
their acts. As such, they must answer for student injury 
resulting in situations in which they have been alleged as 
having been negligent. Moreover, even in those states 
which have set aside governmental immunity, the court may 
exonerate the school district and find only the teacher or 
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coach negligent. 
An excellent example of the responsibility of teachers 
and principals is Larson v. Independent School District 
(1979). The State of Minnesota had set aside governmental 
immunity by enacting a statute allowing the school district 
to purchase liability insurance. In attempting a 
headspring over a rolled mat, a required activity in the 
junior high school physical education class, Steven Larson 
broke his neck. The injury resulted in quadraplegic 
paralysis. The class was being taught by a first-year 
teacher who had just taken over the class nine periods 
earlier. The jury determined that the new teacher and the 
principal were personally negligent and awarded over 
$1 million in damages to the plaintiff. The determination 
was based on the lack of close supervision by the principal 
of a new, inexperienced teacher who demonstrated poor 
performance in not using the progression outlined in the 
physical education syllabus and by not spotting properly. 
The school district was exonerated since negligence was 
attributed strictly to the poor performance of employees. 
Summary 
School districts traditionally have been exempt from 
liability for school-related injuries under the doctrine 
of governmental immunity adapted by the courts in this 
country in 1860. Because the doctrine left the private 
citizen no recourse for injuries sustained on school 
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property or in school-related activities, the trend has 
been for the doctrine to be modified or abrogated by 
judicial and legislative action. 
The school district and the school board may be found 
liable in those states which have abrogated or modified 
the doctrine of governmental immunity. These school 
districts may be liable for school-related injuries 
resulting from (a) unsafe conditions, (b) wilful and 
wanton misconduct, (c) the presence of a nuisance, 
(d) proprietary functions, and (e) ministerial acts. In 
comparison, teachers and coaches may be found liable in 
all states. However, save-harmless laws have permitted or 
required school boards to reimburse these employees for 
losses suffered in liability suits when these educators 
were acting within the bounds of their employment. 
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CHAPTER III 
COURT CASES INVOLVING INJURIES IN SCHOOL-SPONSORED SPORT 
PROGRAMS DUE TO ALLEGED UNSAFE CONDITION OF EQUIPMENT 
The number of reported equipment cases and the 
decade, frequency, and state within which they were 
litigated are presented initially. After this background 
information is presented and discussed, the chapter is 
organised in six major sections. The first three sections 
include (a) court cases related to athletic programs, 
(b) court cases related to physical education programs, and 
(c) court cases related to intramural programs. Age, role, 
sex, and sport or activity are discussed in each section. 
Legal principles applied and legal precedents established 
are included within the legal analysis of cases in each 
program. Cases are categorized as those in which recovery 
to the injured party was either denied or allowed. The 
fourth section includes a summary of the analyses of cases 
in the three school-sponsored sport programs. Observed 
trends and guidelines developed after the cases were 
analyzed in the three school-sponsored sport programs are 
included in the last two sections of the chapter. 
Thirteen cases were reported in which the condition 
of equipment was alleged as the proximate cause of injury 
to participants in school-sponsored sport programs. Two 
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cases (Bush v. City of Norwalk. 1983; flafflia V, State, 
1965) are unique in that the condition of both equipment 
and facilities was alleged as the proximate cause of 
injury. Consequently, these two cases are considered in 
this chapter as well as in the chapter in which facilities 
are discussed (Chapter IV). 
Table 1 depicts the frequency, decade, and state 
within which cases alleging the condition of equipment as 
the proximate cause of injury occurred. 
Table 1 
Occurrence and Location of Cases in Which the Condition of 
Equipment Was Alleged as the Proximate Cause of Injury 
Decade Frequency Geographical Location 
1920s 1 CA 
1930s 2 o
 
>
 
CT 
1940s 1 NY 
1950s - -
1960s 2 OR, NY 
1970s 3 F*, MA, IL 
1980s 4 IL, PA, IL, IL 
^Denotes United States Court of Appeals (10th Cir.) 
It is interesting to note that there were only one or two 
cases involving equipment in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 
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1960s. However, there were three cases in the 1970s, and 
four in the 1980s. Even though only four years are 
included in the 1980s' decade, more cases were reported for 
these years than for any previous full decade. More than 
half of the cases (61%) involved suits in California (2), 
Illinois (4), and New York (2). Of particular import is 
the case Wells v. Colorado College (1973) which reached 
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. The 
Wells case is the single case, of all those reported for 
both equipment and facilities in school-sponsored sport 
programs, to reach the federal courts. 
Athletics 
There were five cases in which the condition of 
equipment was alleged as the proximate cause of injury to 
participants in school-sponsored athletic programs. These 
cases are presented in two contexts: (a) through a 
description of the elements and (b) through a legal 
analysis of the cases. 
Description of Elements 
Each case was analyzed to determine the age, role, 
sex, and sport or activity involved. The occurrence of 
these elements is depicted in Table 2. 
The only case in which the injured party was younger 
(junior high school student) was Mitchell v. Hartman 
(1931). The other four cases involved injury to older 
students. The injured students in Vendrell v. School 
52 
District No. 26C. Malheur County (1962), Thomas v. Chicago 
Board Of Education (1979), and Montag v. Board of 
Education, School Pistriot No, 4Q. Rook Island County 
(1983) were high school students, and in Everett v. Buckv 
Warren. Inc. (1978) the injured player was a 19-year-old 
attending a preparatory school. 
Table 2 
Elements in Cases of Alleged Unsafe Equipment in Athletics 
Elements 
Case and Year Age Role Sex Sport/ 
Activity 
Mitchell v. Hartman Y p M Football 
(1931) 
Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. 0 p M Football 
(1962) 
Everett v. Bucky Warren 0 p M Ice hockey 
(1978) 
Thomas v. Chicago Brd. 0 p M Football 
(1979) 
Montag v. Brd. of Ed. 0 p M Gymnastics 
(1983) 
All five cases involved injuries to male participants. 
With the exception of gymnastics, all injured participants 
were engaged in practice or game play in a team sport. 
Legal Analysis 
In analysing cases in which participants were injured 
in school-sponsored athletic programs and negligence was 
alleged due to unsafe conditions of equipment, cases are 
categorised as those in which recovery to the injured 
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party was either denied ae allowed. The circumstances 
giving rise to each case, issues involved, decision 
rendered, and legal principles applied are included for 
each case. When any of the other equipment cases which 
have been reported are relied on as precedent for the 
instant case, such will be noted. 
Recovery denied. Two athletic cases were reported in 
which the decisions favoring the defendants were based on 
governmental immunity. In Mitchell v. Hartman (1931), a 
junior high school athlete was killed when the supporting 
framework of a tackling dummy fell on him while he was 
using the piece of equipment. The members of the school 
board were held not individually liable for injuries 
resulting from negligent installation or maintenance of 
the tackling dummy on the school campus. Such immunity 
resulted from a California statute expressly exempting 
individual members of city boards of education from 
personal liability for accidents to children on 
playgrounds. 
The court in Mitchell relied on a previous decision 
in 1929 in Dawson v. Tulare Union High School District, a 
physical education case. In Dawson the court interpreted 
Section 1623 of the California Political Code as expressly 
exempting members of city boards of education from 
"...personal liability for accidents to children...in 
connection with school work" (p. 426). 
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A high school varsity football player was seriously 
injured in a regularly scheduled game in Thomas v. Chicago 
Board of Education (1979), the second case in which 
governmental immunity was upheld. Players on the 
plaintiff's team were provided with equipment including 
helmets and face masks. Thomas alleged that the defendant 
coaches were negligent in failing to inspect the football 
equipment for defects. The football coaches were found to 
be immune under the School Code. 
Absent wilful and wanton conduct in the course of 
their supervisory authority, which encompasses 
inspecting and supplying the students with equipment, 
teachers and coaches are immune under...the School 
Code (Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education. 1979, 
p. 541). 
Interestingly, under the Illinois School Code, teachers 
were found to stand in the place of parents and guardians. 
In the absence of wilful and wanton conduct, children in 
Illinois could not maintain actions for negligence against 
their parents (or teachers). 
There were two other athletic cases in which the 
courts ruled for the defendants, finding no negligence on 
their part. In Vendrell v. School District No. 26C. 
Malheur County (1962), the injured high school football 
player had participated previously in the sport in junior 
high school. At the time of his neck injury, he was 
tackled by two players on the other team as he was carrying 
the ball. Although protective equipment (helmets, shoulder 
pads, rib pads, and hip pads together with uniforms) had 
been distributed to the players in the presence of the 
coaches, the coaches did not actually help the players fit 
their equipment. The helmet selected by the plaintiff in 
August had been discarded several weeks later when he split 
it in a game when he ran head on into an opposing player. 
He returned to the equipment room and selected another 
helmet. Uncontradicted evidence indicated that the 
defendant had an agreement with an outside concern whereby 
all of the equipment was inspected regularly, and defective 
parts were discarded and replaced with new parts. 
Vendrell alleged that the defendant had been negligent 
in six areas in that Vendrell (a) was an inexperienced 
football player, (b) weighed 140 pounds, (c) was not 
physically coordinated, (d) was injured when tackled hard 
by two members of the opposing team, (e) had not received 
proper or sufficient instructions, and (f) had not been 
furnished with the necessary or proper protective 
equipment. In regard to the six areas of alleged 
negligence, respectively, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled 
that they (a) could not warrant a finding that Vendrell 
was an inexperienced player at the time of the injury, 
{b) did not believe his weight could furnish the basis for 
a finding of negligence on the defendant's part., (c) did 
not believe the testimony indicated any negligence on the 
defendant's part, (d) did not view the fact that he was 
tackled hard by two players on the other team established 
negligence on the defendant's part, (e) had no indication 
that Vendrell's equipment, if it was not proper, had any 
bearing on his injury, and (f) perceived the instruction 
and practice given by the coaches as adequate and standard 
All charges and responses are given in this 
explanation since the complaint originally did not allege 
any shortcomings in the protective equipment. A charge of 
this kind was not made until the third amended complaint 
was filed more than seven-and-one-half years after the 
injury occurred. 
The basis for the court's ruling that the plaintiff 
assumed the risk of being tackled was expressed vividly by 
the court. 
Body contacts, bruises, and clashes are inherent in 
the game. There is no other way to play it. No 
prospective player need be told that a participant in 
the game of football may sustain injury. That fact 
is self evident. It draws to the game the manly; 
they accept its risks, blows, clashes and injuries 
without whimper (pp. 412, 413). 
Vendrell (1962) was unique in another aspect. The 
case was the first and only one concerning equipment in 
which the authorized purchase of liability insurance was 
held to constitute an implied waiver of immunity to the 
extent of the insurance coverage. 
The second athletic case in which there was a finding 
of no negligence was Montag v. Board of Education. School 
District No. 40. Rock Island County (1983). The issue in 
this case was whether the board of education negligently 
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failed to supply the gymnasium with adequate safety 
equipment. At the time of injury, the 16-year-old 
plaintiff was practicing for competition in the still 
rings event. He had prior experience in previous physical 
education classes on the rings, had been a member of the 
gymnastics team for three months prior to his injury, and 
had competed in all but one of the interscholastic meets 
held that year. 
Two 1-inch thick mats and one 4-inch thick mat were 
underneath the rings during his performance. In executing 
a base uprise dismount, the athlete landed on his back, 
immediately suffering paralysis. The only 12-inch thick 
mat in the gymnasium was not under the rings because it 
interfered with the performance of taller members of the 
team. Additionally, only six inches of matting was 
normally allowed under the rings in competition. The 
coach, who at the time of the injury was nearby acting as 
a spotter, testified that he was trying to simulate 
competitive conditions. The ruling that the board of 
education was not negligent in failing to supply the 
gymnasium with adequate safety equipment was based on the 
opinion that there was no undeniable evidence that the mat 
used was in any way defective, or improperly used, or that 
a 12-inch thick mat, instead of a 4-inch thick mat, could 
have prevented the injury. 
Recovery allowed. In only one of the five athletic 
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cases was recovery allowed. The helmet manufacturer, the 
retailer, and the school the plaintiff was attending were 
named as defendants in a product liability case 
(Everett v. Buckv Warren. Inc.. 1978). Head injuries were 
sustained by a 19-year-old athlete when an ice hockey puck 
penetrated the gap in the three-piece helmet he was 
wearing. 
The jury found that all three defendants were 
negligent, that the helmet was defective and unreasonably 
dangerous, that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by 
the condition of the helmet and the negligence of the 
defendants, and that the plaintiff neither assumed the 
risk of the injury nor was contributorily negligent. The 
manufacturer of the helmet testified that the helmet had 
been designed in three pieces, not for safety reasons, but 
to facilitate adjustment. Additionally, the manufacturer 
knew that other manufacturers were producing one-piece 
helmets, but failed to test the three-piece helmet to 
determine its safety. 
The school through its agent, the coach, was negligent 
in supplying the helmet to the plaintiff. The coach was 
experienced in the game of hockey and "may be held to a 
higher standard of care and knowledge than would an 
average person " (p. 659). The coach conceded in his 
testimony that the one-piece helmets other teams wore were 
safer than the three-piece model since the gaps in the 
59 
latter would allow penetration. 
Physical Education 
Description of Elements 
There were five cases in physical education programs 
in which the condition of equipment was alleged as the 
proximate cause of injury to participants. Each case was 
analysed to determine the age, roJ.s, sex, and sport or 
activity involved. The occurrence of these elements is 
depicted in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Elements in Cases of Alleged Unsafe 
Equipment in Physical Education 
Elements 
Case and Year Age Role Sex Sport/ 
Activity 
Dawson v. Tulare Union 0 P F Jumping game 
(1929) 
Bush v. City of Norwalk Y P M Balance 
(1937) beam 
Govel v. Brd. of Ed. 0 P M Somersault 
(1944) over bars 
Hanna v. State 0 P M Baseball 
(1965) 
Weiss v. Collinsville 0 P M Softbal1 
(1983) 
With the exception of Bush v. City of Norwalk (1937) 
in which an 8-year-old was injured, injuries reported in 
physical education cases involved older students. High 
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school students were injured in Dawson v. Tulare Union 
High School District (1929), Govel v. Board of Education 
of City of New York (1944), and Weiss v. Collinsville 
Community Unit School District No 10 (1983); Hanna v. 
State (19S5) involved injury to a college student. 
All physical education cases involved injury to 
participants, and four of the five injured students were 
males. No two activities in which injuries occurred were 
the same. 
Legal Analysis 
In analysing cases in which participants were injured 
in school-sponsored physical education programs and 
negligence was alleged due to unsafe conditions of 
equipment, cases are categorized as those in which recovery 
to the injured party was either denied QT allowed. 
The circumstances giving rise to each case, issues 
involved, decision rendered, and legal principles applied 
are included for each case. When any of the other 
equipment cases which have been reported are relied on as 
precedent for the instant case, such will be noted. 
Recovery denied. One of the two physical education 
cases reported in which the decision favored the defendant 
was based on governmental immunity. In Weiss v. 
Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 (1983), 
the ruling handed down was similar to that in another 
Illinois case previously discussed under athletics (Thomas 
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v. Chicago Board of Education. 1979). In Weiss, the high 
school student pitcher, while covering first base in a 
physical education class, was injured when the batter slid 
into first base. The softball diamond was regulation size, 
and first base was a rubber mat about 12 inches square and 
about one-half to three-fourths of an inch thick. The 
issue was whether the school district was negligent in its 
alleged failure to instruct the students in base running 
and sliding techniques used in softball, failure to 
maintain the first base line, failure to provide a secure 
first base, and failure to provide a safe field. 
In Illinois, in the absence of proof of wilful and 
wanton misconduct, educators were immune from tort 
liability for personal injuries sustained by students 
during school activities. The court found that the school 
district was not guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct 
and, therefore, was immune from liability since there was 
no showing of substantial defect in the field or equipment 
and the condition of the field was not shown to have in any 
way been the cause of the injury. The court also included 
in its decision information important for consideration. 
While the unsecured rubber mat which was used as 
first base conceivably could have contributed to 
plaintiff's injury, and while a secured canvas bag 
may offer safety advantages, we cannot say that the 
use of the mat or the failure to employ a secured 
canvas bag amounted to wilful and wanton misconduct 
(P. 617). 
The second physical education case in which recovery 
was denied involved injury to a college participant in a 
baseball game (Hanna v. State. 1965). While acting as a 
substitute in the game in which the class was involved, 
Hanna announced that he would umpire. While umpiring 
behind the portable backstop, the plaintiff was struck 
in the face by a foul tipped ball and the glasses he was 
wearing were shattered. The ball did not go through the 
net, but the net was slack enough to give and allow the 
ball to strike him. 
Although Hanna had received a typed outline of 
instructions including reference to the use of protective 
equipment at the beginning of the baseball unit, he was 
not wearing an available protective guard over his glasses 
Moreover, the teacher previously had instructed the 
students to stand far enough behind the portable cage to 
avoid being hit by a foul tip. Hanna had been crouched 
about a foot from the net umpiring for about 15 minutes 
prior to his injury. During that time, three or four foul 
tips had struck the net. 
The court held that the condition of the net was not 
the cause of the injury. Nor did the use of a portable 
backstop in a baseball game in a physical education class 
constitute negligence on the part of the state or its 
employees. The court did find that the plaintiff was 
aware that there purposely was slack in the netting and 
was charged with the knowledge that to stand with his 
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face too close to the net would be dangerous. His failure 
to maintain a safe distance from the net was the proximate 
cause of the accident resulting in his eye injury and 
precluded recovery. 
Recovery allowed. A finding of negligence of a 
school, district through the principal was handed down in 
Dawson v. Tulare Union High School District, a 1929 
physical education case. A high school student engaged in 
a jumping game during a physical education class suffered 
injury when an upright piano fell and crushed one of her 
ankles. The piano used in the school gymnasium was 
resting on a dolly used to move it from one place to 
another. The piano had been kept on the dolly for more 
than a year at the time of the injury and had fallen 
backwards a year previously on the leg of another student 
who was trying to move it. In the instant case, vibrations 
from the jumping game caused the piano to slip off the 
dolly. 
The issue in Dawson (1929) was whether an exception 
to governmental immunity existed under the safe-place 
statute. The court ruled for the plaintiff on the basis 
of this statute which placed liability on school districts 
for injuries to pupils resulting from the maintenance of a 
dangerous or defective condition of buildings, grounds, 
and property when those with the authority to remedy such 
defects had knowledge or notice of the condition and 
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failed or neglected to remedy it within a reasonable time. 
The statute contained no provision that actual notice was 
a prerequisite to recovery. The long-continued existence 
of a defective condition could establish constructive 
notice. In this case the fact that the piano had been 
maintained in a dangerous condition for more than a year 
was sufficient to establish that school personnel had 
knowledge of the condition (constructive notice). 
Whether a balance beam as used on a slippery classroom 
floor constituted a nuisance was the issue in a 1937 
physical education case (Bush v. City of Norwalk). As the 
8-year-old plaintiff was walking along the beam, the beam 
slipped on the floor to one side, causing him to fall. 
The bottom of the beam was smooth and had nothing to 
prevent its slipping on the floor, and the top of the beam 
had been varnished and was slippery. The classroom floor 
had been oiled and was somewhat slippery, and there were 
no mats along the beam. 
The court held that the beam as used on the floor was 
likely to slip and cause any child walking along it to 
fall and, as such, was a source of danger to the children 
using it. The decision was that a nuisance was created by 
the use of the beam on the classroom floor. 
The decision in a 1944 physical education case 
Govel v. Board of Education of City of New York held a 
physical education teacher liable for injuries sustained 
by a student in his class. The student, who was attempting 
a somersault over the parallel bars, fractured a leg when 
he fell to the floor after his foot struck the bars. 
The high school student participant took off from a 
springboard covered with a mat. The parallel bars were 
draped with mats. Although the floor on the landing side 
was supposed to be covered with a double mat, Govel fell 
on the bare floor. A day or two previously, another 
student had broken his arm executing the same maneuver, 
and "quite a few" students had been injured in the past. 
The court ruled that the physical education teacher 
was negligent, noting that he had assigned the plaintiff, 
who was not exceptionally well skilled, to perform gin 
acrobatic maneuver beyond his prowess and which was not 
recommended in the regent's syllabus. The decision also was 
based on the fact that several boys had been injured 
previously while performing such maneuvers and that the 
teacher had not placed the landing mat properly. 
Intramurals 
Description of Elements 
Three cases involved injuries to participants in 
intramural programs in which the condition of equipment 
was alleged as the proximate cause of injury. Each case 
was analysed to determine the age, role, sex, and sport or 
activity involved. The occurrence of these elements is 
depicted in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Elements in Cases of Alleged Unsafe 
Equipment in Intramurals 
Case and Year 
Elements 
Age Role Sex Sport/ 
Activity-
Wells v. Colorado College 0 P F 
(1973) 
Lynch v. Brd. of Ed. 0 P F 
(1980) 
Berman v. Philadelphia Y P M 
(1983) 
Self defense 
Powderpuff 
football 
Floor hockey 
Injured students in these three cases represented 
three different school levels. The younger student 
(Berman v. Philadelphia Board of Education. 1983) was in 
elementary school and the two older (Lynch v. Board of 
Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10. 
1980; Wells v. Colorado College. 1973) in high school and 
college, respectively. All injured students were 
participants at the time of injury, and two of the three 
were females. No two activities were the same. 
Legal Analysis 
In analysing cases in which participants were injured 
in school-sponsored intramural programs and negligence was 
alleged due to unsafe conditions of equipment, cases are 
categorised as those in which recovery to the injured 
party was either denied or allowed. The circumstances 
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giving rise to each case, issues involved, decision 
rendered, and legal principles applied are included for 
each case. When any of the other equipment cases which 
have been reported are relied on as precedent for the 
instant case, such will be noted. 
Recovery allowed. Recovery was allowed in all three 
reported intramural cases in which the condition of 
equipment was alleged as the proximate cause of the injury 
to participants. In Wells v. Colorado College (1973), the 
only case to reach the federal courts, a college woman 
student was injured when she hit the floor after a hip 
throw executed by the police officer-instructor. Colorado 
College had sponsored a series of sessions in self defense 
for students since a number of incidents involving assaults 
had occurred on campus. The college had employed two 
Colorado Springs police officers to conduct the sessions. 
The class had been working in pairs on the hip throw. 
When the plaintiff's partner was unable to throw her, the 
police officer demonstrated the throw on the plaintiff. 
She was thrown on her back but did not land on the mat. 
The two mats had come apart, and her back hit partly on 
the floor and partly on the mat. The injury involved the 
vertebral disc in her lower back and persisted despite two 
operations. She lost one year of school as a result of her 
injury. She had excelled in ice skating, swimming, diving, 
skiing, and horseback riding before the injury. 
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Afterwards, she was unable to do anything more strenuous 
than walking. 
The court found that the case was not one involving a 
sport whose activity is commonly associated with the 
assumption of risk doctrine. Rather, the plaintiff was 
participating in a scheduled session and was doing so for 
a practical reason. The court ruled that the plaintiff 
could not have been expected to anticipate an extraordinary 
hazard such as that to which she was subjected and had a 
right to expect that she would be thrown on the mat and not 
the hardwood floor. The police officer breached his duty 
of care which was commensurate with the high degree of 
hazard in the activity. 
A second intramural case involved injury to a high 
school student participating in a powderpuff tackle 
football game held prior to the homecoming game (Lynch v. 
Board of Education of Collinsville Community Unit District 
No. 10. 1980). After having been struck in the face by a 
member of the other team, the plaintiff hit the back of 
her head on the ground, suffered a broken nose, underwent 
psychiatric treatment, and suffered possible brain damage. 
The issue was whether the defendant school district 
was negligent in failing to provide the plaintiff with 
protective equipment. The new principal testified that 
the game was not sponsored by the school because the 
procedure by which the board of education approved a 
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faculty sponsor was not followed. Also, he had denied 
permission to students to make an announcement about the 
game over the school's public address system. In fact, 
when he heard that such an announcement had been made, he 
instructed the assistant principal to make a countermanding 
announcement that the game was not an authorised school 
activity. 
Three teachers had agreed to coach the two teams, and 
between four and six practices were held prior to the 
game. Practices consisted mostly of passing, hiking the 
ball, and blocking. One of the teachers suggested that 
the players purchase mouth guards, and most of the players, 
including the plaintiff, did purchase and wear mouth guards 
for the game. 
Even though the Supreme Court of Illinois indicated 
that the teachers were not acting in the course of their 
employment, it considered the possibility that some 
students thought they were engaging in an activity 
connected with the school program. The school athletic 
field was used for practices and the game. The players 
were allowed to use the school locker rooms. Several 
announcements had been made concerning the game and 
practice sessions. According to the court, it could 
appear to a reasonably prudent person that the teachers 
possessed the authority to coach the game. Therefore, the 
school district was held to be negligent since the teachers 
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were acting with apparent authority. 
The court stated that a school district has an 
affirmative duty to furnish equipment to prevent serious 
injuries when students are engaging in school activities. 
"At the least, a school district should furnish helmets 
and face guards for a game such as football, where head 
injuries are common and severe" (p. 459). 
In finding that the school district's failure to 
provide such equipment was a proximate cause of the 
injury, the court gave good direction for responsibility 
of school districts in furnishing equipment. 
If we were not to hold the defendant liable for 
failure to furnish any equipment, a school district 
could easily escape liability simply by not furnishing 
any equipment to students, thereby forcing students 
to purchase equipment themselves. In that way, only 
students who could afford their own equipment would 
be able to engage in school-connected sports 
activities. We are unwilling to encourage such a 
result (p. 460). 
Interestingly, three of the seven justices dissented. 
Their reasoning was based primarily on the premise that 
this football game was not a school activity for which the 
school district had a duty to furnish equipment. They 
believed that the school had done everything possible to 
disassociate itself from the powderpuff football game 
short of prohibiting the teachers from coaching the teams 
and prohibiting the use of the athletic fields for the 
game. 
The issue in the third intramural case was whether the 
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school board breached its duty in not furnishing mouth 
guards to floor hockey participants (Berman v. Philadelphia 
Board of Education. 1983). The 11-year-old plaintiff 
received severe injuries to his mouth when an opposing 
player's stick struck him in the mouth. 
Although the players were provided with hockey sticks 
with wooden handles and plastic blades, no helmets, face 
masks, mouth guards, shin guards, or gloves were provided. 
The teacher conducting the activity was aware that mouth 
injuries were recurring consequences of playing the sport, 
and on two or three separate occasions had requested that 
the board of education purchase safety equipment for the 
students. 
The court viewed the 11-year-old plaintiff as 
incapable of contributory negligence. Moreover, by reason 
of his "tender age and lack of intelligence, experience, 
and information" (p.550), the court ruled that he did not 
appreciate the dangers of floor hockey and, consequently, 
that assumption of risk was not a viable defense either. 
Summary of Case Analyses 
There were 13 reported cases in which the condition of 
equipment was alleged as the proximate cause of injury in 
school-sponsored sport programs. The occurrence of 
reported cases has increased dramatically in the recent 
past with 8 of the 13 cases from 1929 to 1983 having been 
reported in the past 10 years. Moreover, throughout the 
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years since the first reported equipment case in the 1920s, 
more than half of all cases have occurred in California 
(2), Illinois (4), and New York (2). 
The occurrence of reported equipment cases- was fairly 
consistent across all school-sponsored sport programs with 
five in athletics, five in physical education, and three 
in intramurals (Table 5). More injured students were at 
the high school level or beyond (10) than at the junior 
high level or below (3), and all were participants at the 
time of their injury. There were 10 male injured students 
and 3 female injured students. No females were injured in 
the five athletic cases, one in the five physical education 
cases, and two in the three intramural cases. When 
reviewing activities in all three school-sponsored sport 
programs in which injured participants were engaging, 
10 of the 13 activities were different. 
As presented in Table 5, recovery was denied in six 
cases—four in athletics and two in physical education. 
The decisions denying recovery in two of the athletic cases 
and one of the physical education cases were based on 
governmental immunity. The decisions in the other two 
athletic cases and in the other physical education case 
were based on no negligence on the part of the defendant. 
Recovery was allowed in the remaining seven cases—one 
in athletics, three in physical education, and three in 
intramurals. In Everett v. Buckv Warren. Inc. (1978), the 
Table 5 
Summary of Cases Involving Equipment in Athletics, 
Physical Education, and Intramurals 
RECOVERY DENIED 
Page # of 
Analysis Case/Year 
School-Sponsored 
Sport Program Age Role Sex 
Legal 
Principle 
Legal 
Precedent* 
53 Mitchell 
(1931) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
Y P M Gov. immunity Dawson (1929) 
54 Thomas v. 
Chic. (1979) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
0 P M Gov. immunity None 
54 Vendrell 
(1962) 
Athletics 
' (Football) 
0 P M No negligence None 
56 Montag 
(1983) 
Athletics 
(Gymnastics) 
0 P M No negligence None 
60 Weiss 
(1983) 
Physical Educ. 
(Softball) 
0 P M Gov. immunity None 
62 Hanna 
(1965) 
Physical Educ. 
(Baseball) 
0 P M No negligence ~ None 
RECOVERY ALLOWED 
Page // of 
Analysis Case/Year 
School-Sponsored 
Sport Program Age Ro le Sex 
Breach 
of Duty 
Legal 
Precedent* 
58 Everett 
(1978) 
Athletics 
(Ice hockey) 
0 P M Defective and 
unreasonably 
None 
d A n e e r o u s  

60 Heiss Physical Educ. 0 P M Gov. immunity None 
(1983) (Softball) 
62 Hanna 
(1965) 
Physical Educ. 
(Baseball) 
0 P M No negligence None 
RECOVERY ALLOWED 
Page # of 
Analysis Case/Year 
School-Sponsored 
Sport Program Age Role Sex 
Breach 
of Duty 
Legal 
Precedent* 
58 Everett 
(1978) 
Athletics 
(Ice hockey) 
0 P M Defective and 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
equipment 
None 
4 
63 Dawson 
(1929) 
Physical Educ. 
(Jumping game) 
0 P F Unsafe condi­
tion of piano 
on dolly 
(Safe-place) 
None 
64 Bush 
(1937) 
Physical Educ. 
(Balance beam) 
Y P M Improper con­
dition of 
balance beam 
as used 
(Nuisance) 
None 
64 Govel 
(1944) 
Physical Educ. 
(Parallel bars) 
0 P M Improper mat 
placement 
None 
67 Hells 
(1973) 
Intramurals 
(Self-defense) 
0 P F Improper mat 
placement 
None 
68 Lynch 
(1980) 
Intramurals 
(Powderpuff 
football) 
• 0 P F Inadequate 
protective 
equipment 
None 
71 Berman 
(1983) 
Intramurals 
(Floor hockey) 
Y P M Inadequate 
protective 
equipment 
None 
*Cases cited as precedent include only those involving equipment as the proximate cause 
of injury. 
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decision was based on the defendants' negligence in 
providing a dangerous and defective ice hockey helmet. In 
one physical education case (Bush v. City of Norwalk. 
1937), a balance beam as used on a slippery floor 
constituted a nuisance, and in another (Dawson v. Tulare 
Union High School. 1929) the defendant had notice of the 
dangerous condition of a piano as maintained but failed to 
remedy the situation. Recovery was allowed in one physical 
education case (Govel v. Board of Education of City of New 
York. 1944) and in one intramural case (Wells v. Colorado 
College. 1973) for improper placement of mats for landings 
in gymnastics and self-defense, respectively. Recovery was 
allowed also in the other two intramural cases (Berman v. 
Philadelphia Board of Education. 1983; Lynch v. Board of 
Education of Collinsville Community Unit District No. 10. 
1980) for the defendant's failure to provide protective 
equipment (mouth guards for floor hockey participants and 
helmets and face guards for powderpuff football 
participants, respectively). 
Trends 
It is difficult to state with confidence general 
trends on the basis of the small number of resolved cases 
(13) in which equipment was alleged as the proximate cause 
of injury in school sponsored sport programs. However, 
several interesting points seemed to emerge. 
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1. Eight of the 13 cases from 1929 to 1983 which 
involved equipment were reported in the past 10 
years. Modifications and exceptions to 
governmental immunity over the years may have 
allowed the courts to consider more cases than in 
the past when governmental immunity discouraged 
lawsuits or curtailed any type of redress. 
2. All injured persons were participants, most were 
older, and most were male. No sport or activity 
emerged as being.associated with a particular 
defense. 
3. While all of the cases in which recovery was 
allowed were based on breach of duty, two of the 
cases involved an exception to the doctrine of 
governmental immunity. 
4. Decisions in two of the cases (Berman v. 
Philadelphia Board of Education. 1983; Hanna v. 
State. 1965) support age of the plaintiff as a 
determining factor in contributory negligence. 
The court in Hanna (1965) held that an older, 
experienced individual was capable of 
contributory negligence while the court in Berman 
(1983) held that a younger, immature, and 
inexperienced individual was incapable of being 
contributor.!ly negligent. 
5. The points emphasised are based on only 13 cases. 
Recovery was allowed in only 1 athletic case, 
3 physical education cases, and all 3 intramural 
cases. If there is a prevailing trend, it is that 
care must be given in making generalities, for 
each case appears to have been decided on its own 
merits. Only 1 of the cases considered (Dawson. 
1929) was used as precedent for any of the others. 
Guidelines 
An analysis of the 13 cases involving equipment in 
school-sponsored sport programs revealed points to be 
considered by teachers and coaches. Each case was decided 
on its own merits. Guidelines were extrapolated from 
individual cases. With these limitations in mind and with 
no emphasis on priority, the following guidelines are 
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suggested: 
1. Provide adequate and safe equipment to students 
who are engaging in school-sponsored sport 
programs. 
2. Inspect equipment regularly for defects, and 
repair or discard equipment which is not in good 
working order. 
3. Provide safety equipment which meets the standards 
considered usual and customary by the profession. 
j 
4. Recognise that students participating in athletic, 
physical education, and intramural programs may 
only be expected to act as a reasonable person of 
the same age, intelligence, and experience would 
act. 
5. Instigate immediate corrective action after notice 
of dangerous or defective conditions of equipment/ 
6. Utilise equipment in a manner commensurate with 
its intended purpose. 
7. Use care in positioning landing mats properly for 
the activity when landing mats are necessary for 
bhe safe conduct of school-sponsored sport 
programs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COURT CASES INVOLVING INJURIES IN SCHOOL-SPONSORED SPORT 
PROGRAMS DUE TO ALLEGED UNSAFE CONDITION OF FACILITIES 
The number of reported facility cases and the decade, 
frequency, and state within which they were litigated are 
presented initially. After this background information is 
presented and discussed, the chapter is organised in six 
major sections. The first three sections include 
(a) court cases related to athletic programs, (b) court 
cases related to physical education programs, and 
(c) court cases related to intramural programs. Age, 
role, sex, and sport or activity are discussed in each 
section. Legal principles applied and legal precedents 
established are included within the legal analysis of 
cases in each program. Cases are categorised as those in 
which recovery to the injured party was either denied or 
allowed. The fourth section includes a summary of the 
analyses of cases in the three school-sponsored sport 
programs. Observed trends and guidelines developed after 
the cases were analysed in the three school-sponsored sport 
programs are included in the last two sections of the 
chapter. 
Forty-eight cases were reported in which the condition 
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of facilities was alleged as the proximate cause of in jury-
to participants and spectators in school-sponsored sport 
programs. Two cases (Bush v. City of Norwalk. 1983; 
Hanna v. State. 1965) are unique in that the condition of 
both facilities and equipment was alleged as the proximate 
cause of injury. Consequently, these two cases are 
considered in this chapter as well as in the chapter in 
which equipment was discussed (Chapter III). 
Table 6 depicts the frequency, decade, and state 
within which cases alleging the condition of facilities as 
the proximate cause of injury occurred. 
Table 6 
Occurrence and Location of Cases in Which the Condition of 
Facilities Was Alleged as the Proximate Cause of Injury 
Decade Frequency Geographical Location 
1900s 1 MN 
1910s 
1920s 1 MN 
1930s 5 MA, WA, CT, NY, CA 
1940s 5 NY, WI, WA, MT, TN 
1950s 5 NY, AZ, NY, MI, FL 
1960s 12. OR, 
WA, 
NY, 
LA, 
IL, 
GA, 
NY, 
WI, 
LA, 
IA, 
NY, 
KY 
1970s 10 LA, 
NY, 
IN, 
MI, 
LA, 
LA, 
IA, 
SD 
NJ, LA, 
1980s 9 MI, 
NE, 
NY, 
LA, 
GA, 
A1 
NY, NY, NY, 
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The occurrence of only one facility case in the 1900s and 
1920s and five cases in each of the decades from 1930 to 
1950 is not surprising. However, the twelve cases in the 
1960s are noteworthy in that there were more reported cases 
in that decade than in the subsequent decade (1970s). 
Equally noticeable is the occurrence of nine cases in just 
the first four years of the 1980s. 
Although there were reported facility cases in 23 
different states, the number of cases generally ranged 
from one to three with one case occurring in 15 states and 
three in two states (Michigan and Washington). Particularly 
noticeable, however, are the states of Louisiana and 
New York with seven and twelve reported cases, 
respectively. 
Athletics 
There were 29 cases in athletics in which the 
condition of facilities was alleged as the proximate cause 
of injury to participants and spectators in school-
sponsored athletic programs. These cases are presented in 
two contexts: (a) through a description of the elements 
and (b) through a legal analysis of the cases. 
Description of Elements 
Each case was analysed to determine the age, role, 
sex, and sport or activity involved. The occurrence of 
these elements is depicted in Table 7. The chronological 
listing of the cases in Table 7 corresponds to the order 
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Table 7 
Elements in Cases of Alleged Unsafe Facilities in Athletics 
Elements 
Case and Year Age Role Sex Sport/ 
Activity 
George v. U. of Minn. (1909) _ S M Football 
Mokovich v. Ind. Sch. (1929) 0 P M Football 
Ingerson v. Shattuck (1931) 0 S F Football 
Juntila v. Everett (1935) 0 S M Football 
Holzworth v. State (1941) - S M Football 
Rhoades v. Sch Dist. (1943) - S F Basketbal1 
Reed v. Rhea Co. (1949) - S M Football 
Sawaya v. Tucson (1955) - S M Football 
Scott v. State (1956) 0 P M Baseball 
Richards v. Sch. Dist. (1957) 0 S M Footbal1 
Buck v. McLean (1959) 0 s F Baseball 
Bacon v. Harris (1960) - s F Basketball 
Ludwig v. Brd. of Ed. (1962) 0 s M Football 
McGee v. Brd. of Ed. (1962) 0 p M Baseball 
Colclough v. Orleans (1964) 0 s M Football 
Perry v. Seattle Sch. (1965) 0 s F Football 
Turner v. Caddo Parish (1965) 0 s F Football 
Brd. of Ed. v. Fredericks (1966 - s M Football 
Novak v. City of Delavan (1966) 0 s F Football 
Coughlon v. Iowa H. S. (1967) - s - Basketball 
Dudley v. William Penn (1974) 0 p M Baseball 
Nunez v. Isidore Newman (1975) 0 p M Basketball 
McGovern v. Riverdale (1976) 0 p M Basketball 
Thomas v. St Mary's (1979) 0 p M Basketball 
Vargo v. Svitchan (1980) 0 p M Wt. lifting 
Akins v. Glens Falls (1981) - s F Baseball 
Benjamin v. State (1982) Y s M Ice hockey 
Lamphear v. State (1982) 0 p F Softball 
Studley v. Sch. Dist. (1982) 0 p M Basketball 
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in which they will be discussed within each category of 
the legal analysis. 
There were 9 cases in which the age of the injured 
parties could not be discerned. It is noteworthy that in 
all 9 of these cases, the individuals injured were 
spectators at the time of their injury. 
Where the age could be discerned, the only case 
involving a younger injured party was Ben.iamin v. State 
(1982), a case in which an 11-year-old was injured while 
spectating at a college ice hockey game. The other 19 
cases involved injuries to older individuals, 9 who were 
spectators at the time of injury and 10 who were 
participants. 
Of the 29 cases, 10 involved injuries to participants. 
Almost twice as many cases (19) involved injuries to 
spectators. 
Nineteen cases involved injuries to males, 10 who 
were spectators and 9 who were participants. Similarly, 
nine cases involved injuries to females, 8 who were 
spectators at the time of injury and only 1 who was a 
participant. 
. In only one case (Coughlon v. Iowa High School 
Athletic Association. 1967) was the sex of the injured 
party not discernible. CoughIon involved injury to a 
spectator (age also not discernible) when the bleachers 
collapsed at a high school basketball tournament. 
All other spectator injuries occurred while the 
plaintiffs were attending team sport games. There were 
nine males and four females injured at football games. 
However, with the exception of one male injured at an ice 
hockey game, all other injuries to spectators occurred to 
females, two at basketball games and two at baseball games 
Legal Analysis 
In analyzing cases in which participants and 
spectators were injured in school-sponsored athletic 
programs and negligence was alleged due to unsafe 
conditions of facilities, cases are categorized as those 
in which recovery to the injured party was either denied 
or allowed. The circumstances giving rise to each case, 
issues involved, decision rendered, and legal principles 
applied are included for each case. When any of the other 
facility cases which have been reported are relied on as 
precedent for the instant case, such will be noted. 
Moreover, participant and spectator cases will be 
considered separately to facilitate consideration of cases 
in regard to the role assumed by injured parties. 
Recovery denied. Recovery was denied the plaintiff 
in 23 of the 29 athletic cases. Seven of the cases 
involved participants and 16 involved spectators. 
Two of the decisions favoring the defendants in 
athletic cases in which participants were injured were 
based on governmental immunity. One issue in Mokovich v. 
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Independent School District of Virginia. No. 22 (1929) was 
whether the officers and agents of the school district 
negligently used unslaked lime to mark the football field, 
thereby causing a nuisance. Mokovich was a participant in 
a high school football game when he was thrown to the 
ground and his head and face forced into the lime. As a 
result of the lime getting into his eyes, he lost the 
sight in one eye and the sight in the other was seriously 
impaired. 
The plaintiff also sought recovery on the basis 
that the school district could not claim governmental 
immunity since, by charging admission to the game, it had 
been engaged in a proprietary function. However, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected this contention by 
ruling that the small incidental charge did not "...take 
the district out of its educational functions and convert 
the activity into one of a business or proprietary 
character" (p, 294). In ruling for the defendant, the 
court held that the school district was exercising a 
governmental function for educational purposes and that 
the school district was not made liable by the fact that 
Mokovich's injury "...was from a nuisance negligently 
created by acts of its officers or agents, nor by the fact 
that an incidental charge was made for admission to the 
game" (p. 295). 
The second case based on governmental immunity was 
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Vargo v. Svitohan (1980). In preparation for high school 
football team tryouts, the 15-year-old student pushed 
himself to lift a 250-300 pound weight, fell, and received 
injuries resulting in paraplegia. The issue in this case 
was whether the gymnasium facilities were inadequate and 
defective because of lack of sufficient ventilation 
causing the plaintiff to perspire excessively and 
contributing to his injuries. The plaintiff alleged also 
that the weight lifting room did not have a sufficient 
number of weight lifting safety machines or power racks 
for the number of students and that the available floor 
mats were not being used on the concrete floor to prevent 
possible slippage and lessen the likelihood of serious 
injury. 
The court noted that the facts indicated that a lack 
of supervision, not a defect in the building, was the cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, the allegations 
did not fall within the statutory public building exception 
(safe-place) to governmental immunity. 
There were four other participant cases in which the 
courts ruled for the defense, finding no negligence on 
their part. The issue in McGee v. Board of Education of 
City of New York (1962) was whether the head coach was 
negligent in conducting baseball practice on a 
nonregulation diamond on which the pitcher's mound was 
located directly between first and third bases and if a 
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sudden departure from the practice routine resulted in the 
assistant coach's injury. 
The plaintiff was a high school teacher who had 
volunteered to assist with the baseball team. While 
working with the pitcher and standing about four to five 
feet behind him, the assistant coach was hit with a thrown 
ball and injured. 
At the time of the injury, practice was being 
conducted on a baseball diamond on which the bases were 
about 80 feet apart instead of the regulation 90 feet. 
The drill consisted of the head coach bunting the ball 
either down one of the baselines or toward the pitcher. A 
player near home plate would then run toward first, and the 
infielders would try to put the runner out. On the play 
in which the injury occurred, a player left second base 
and ran toward third. The first baseman testified that 
the head coach shouted for him to "get the man at third". 
The first baseman threw the ball toward third base and hit 
the assistant coach. 
The head coach was not negligent- in instructing the 
first baseman to throw to third, nor were his actions 
improper in using a modified field for practice. 
Additionally, as an experienced baseball player, the 
plaintiff could have been expected to be alert to the 
dangers of being hit by a thrown or batted ball and. 
assumed the risk of his injury. 
In ruling for the defendant the Supreme Court of 
New York said: 
Generally, the participants in an athletic event are 
held to have assumed the risks of injury normally 
associated with the sport. Players, coaches, 
managers, referees and others who, in one way or 
another, voluntarily participate must accept the 
risks to which their roles expose them. Of course, 
this is not to say that actionable negligence can 
never be committed on a playing field. Considering 
the skill of the players, the rules and nature of the 
particular game, and risks which normally attend it, a 
participant's conduct may amount to such careless 
disregard for the safety of others as to create risks 
not fairly assumed. But it is nevertheless true that 
what the scorekeeper may record as an 'error' is not 
the equivalent, in law, of negligence (pp. 331, 332). 
In Dudley v. William Penn College (1974), the 
plaintiff was sitting on the bench located 36 feet from 
the third base line and 60 feet from home plate. There 
was no protective screen between the players' bench and 
the playing" field. Dudley, a scholarship athlete on 
Penn's team, suffered an eye injury as a result of being 
struck by a foul ball. 
The two issues were whether the college and coach had 
been negligent in not providing a protective screen and 
whether Dudley had been contributorily negligent. The 
plaintiff failed to show that screening or some other means 
of protecting the bench was customary in the Central Iowa 
Conference. Some fields in the conference had screens 
while others did not. In fact, more schools Penn played 
did not have screens than did. Since the court held that 
there was insufficient evidence to justify negligence on 
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the part of the defendants, the issue of contributory-
negligence by Dudley was not considered by the court. 
The issue in Nunes v. Isidore Newman High School 
(1975) was whether the host school had met its duty in 
protecting the plaintiff from dangerous conditions. 
Martin Nunez, a member of one of the basketball teams 
participating in the invitational tournament hosted by 
Isidore Newman High School, slipped, fell, and seriously 
injured his back when he came down after attempting a 
lay-up shot in the third quarter of the game. 
It was hot, very humid, and had rained earlier in the 
day. Due to the high humidity, water condensation had 
formed on the gymnasium floor. Prior to the game that 
night, the floor had been mopped and heaters and fans 
turned on in an attempt to dry the floor. Several times 
during the game, in fact, certain areas on and off the 
playing surface had been mopped. 
In favoring the defendant, the court held that the 
host school owed the plaintiff (a business invitee) the 
duty to take reasonable care to protect him from amy 
dangerous condition. Since none of the coaches and 
officials who were responsible for inspecting amd approving 
the playing conditions considered the floor's condition 
serious enough to discuss cancelling the game, the host 
school had not acted unreasonably in preparing and 
maintaining the premises. 
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Nunes was considered a business invitee since Newman 
was deriving revenue from his participation in the 
gymnasium. The duty owed Nunea was defined by the court: 
A fair statement of that duty is: An owner or 
occupier of lands or buildings must take reasonable 
and ordinary care to protect invitees from any 
dangerous conditions on the premises. He must also 
warn them of any latent dangerous defects in the 
premises and inspect the premises for any possible 
dangerous conditions of which he does not know 
(P. 458). 
In finding that the condensation on the.floor was not 
actually dangerous, the court gave additional guidance 
regarding duty toward invitees: "Unless a condition of the 
building can be termed dangerous then this duty owed to 
invitees will never arise; to hold otherwise would mean 
that the building owner was the insurer of his patron's 
safety" (p. 459). 
In McGovern v. Riverdale Country School Realty 
Company. Inc. (1976), a high school participant in a 
basketball game was injured when he ran into a door at the 
end of the gymnasium while trying to retrieve the ball. 
The door, located 15 feet from the nearest portion of the 
basketball court, had a wire mesh glass insert. The glass 
portion of the door was the portion the plaintiff struck. 
The Supreme Court of New York ruled that the trial court 
properly dismissed the complaint since there was 
insufficient evidence in the record of either unsafe 
physical conditions in the gymnasium or lack of adequate 
supervision. 
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The seventh and last participant case in which 
recovery was denied involved injury to a referee at a 
basketball game (Studlev v. School District No. 38 of Hall 
County. 1982). The issue in this case was whether the 
school district had been negligent in maintaining a 
dangerous condition of the gymnasium floor. 
While refereeing a basketball game, Studley slipped 
and fell. He alleged that moisture had accumulated on the 
gymnasium floor as a result of a leak in the ceiling and 
that the condition of the floor was the proximate cause of 
his injury. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant 
had knowledge of the wet floor's condition but failed to 
notify or appraise him of such. The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska supported the trial court's decision in favor of 
the school district. 
In summary, there were seven cases involving injury 
to participants in school-sponsored athletic programs in 
which recovery was denied. The decisions in two cases 
were based on governmental immunity, and there was no 
negligence on the defendants' part in the other five 
cases. These decisions are further summarised in Table 10 
presented on page 136. 
Of the 19 athletic cases in which injured spectators 
were denied recovery, 9 of the decisions favoring the 
defendants were based on governmental immunity. The 
plaintiff attending an intercollegiate football game in 
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George v. University of Minnesota Athletic Ass'n (1909) was 
injured when the platform on which he was standing 
collapsed. The issue was whether the action was properly 
brought against the University of Minnesota Athletic 
Association. The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the 
defendant was a branch or department of the University of 
Minnesota and, therefore, was exempt under the doctrine of 
governmental immunity. 
In Hoi2worth v. State (1941), the plaintiff was a 
spectator at a football game. While standing on the top 
of his seat, Holaworth was pressured by the crowd and was 
pushed over the edge of an exit. He fell a distance of 12 
feet, sustaining serious injuries. 
The issue was whether action could be maintained 
against the State of Wisconsin. The court denied liability 
principally on the ground that "...a sovereign is not 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the 
negligent acts of its officers" (p. 165). Since Wisconsin 
was recognised as a sovereign state, no suit could be 
maintained against it. 
The issue in Rhoades v. School Dist. No. 9. Roosevelt 
County (1943) was whether a school district was exercising 
a governmental function (as distinguished from a 
proprietary function) and, therefore, not liable for 
injuries sustained by a spectator injured when a stairway 
collapsed. Having paid admission to a basketball game, 
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Pearl Rhoades was injured when one of the stairs in the 
gymnasium gave way. The plaintiff alleged that the 
construction was faulty and that the stairway was not 
properly maintained. 
The court held that the defendant school district 
was acting solely in a governmental capacity. Moreover, 
the court gave explicit direction of the place of activity 
programs in education: 
We have come to regard education—not as a development 
of a part of the faculties, but of all of them—the 
intellectual, the moral, as well as the physical. In 
order to make effective our conclusions... we have 
authorised the proper officers of a school district 
to expend our money in the construction of a 
gymnasium. A part of that physical training consists 
in the playing of games—basket ball fsic1 among 
others . 
...Undoubtedly, one of the elements which 
stimulate fsicl the contestants is that they will be 
afforded an opportunity of exhibiting their skill in 
games against their fellows of the same school or 
against teams of a different school. This, we think, 
is true, not alone as it pertains to physical sports, 
but the same may be said of debating teams, or of band 
concerts, or of exhibitions of the art department of 
a school. The fact that a band concert is held, or 
an exhibition of the work of those in the art 
department of the school had, brings better results 
in each of these departments. Therefore, we conclude 
that the basket ball fsicl game in question was 
merely a part of the program of physical education of 
the school; and, consequently, the defendants were 
exercising governmental functions in connection 
therewith (pp. 891, 892). 
In regard to the effect of charging admission and the 
fee going into the school fund, the court added, "It 
[money] advances the purpose of physical education. That 
is a part of the governmental functions of the school 
district and of its trustees" (p. 892). 
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The ruling that an athletic event to which admission 
was charged was a governmental function also was handed 
down in Reed v. Rhea County (1949). A spectator who had 
paid admission to a high school football game was injured 
when the bleachers on which he was sitting collapsed. 
Reed alleged that the bleachers had collapsed because they 
had been negligently constructed by the high school. Reed 
also alleged that the board of education was liable in 
that it had been acting in a proprietary capacity through 
its maintenance of a private enterprise for profit. 
The court, however, ruled that the board had been 
engaged in a governmental function in holding the football 
game and, therefore, the plaintiff could not recover from 
the board for his injuries. The board was protected by 
the doctrine of governmental immunity. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan also held that the 
defendant school district was engaging in a governmental 
function in Richards v. School District of City of 
Birmingham (1957). A spectator, having paid admission, 
attended a high school football game and was sitting on 
portable bleachers leased by the school district. Before 
the game started, the bleachers on which he was sitting 
collapsed, and the plaintiff sustained serious injuries. 
The court held that the athletic program was a part 
of the educational program of the school and, therefore, 
the school district could not be liable. 
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It may not be said that defendant district, in 
allowing athletic competition with other schools, is 
thereby engaging in a funtion proprietary in nature. 
On the contrary, it is performing a governmental 
function vested in it by law (p. 653). 
In Buck v. McLean (1959), the issue was whether the 
school board had negligently permitted the wire screen 
between the grandstand and the baseball field to 
deteriorate. The field was owned and operated by the 
public school system. The plaintiff, a paying spectator 
at the high school baseball game, was seriously injured 
when a foul ball came through the protective screening and 
struck her in the eye. 
The plaintiff cited Sawaya v. Tucson High School 
District No. 1 (1955) as one of the cases to support her 
claim. Even though the court ruled for the defendant 
school board in its conduct of a governmental function, it 
did make a significant comment after having studied Sawaya 
and related cases: 
We...in all frankness must agree that they rSawaya 
and other cases] are solid support for the position 
which appellants here take. They completely discredit 
and repudiate the ancient doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and reject as unsound the several reasons 
relied upon by our Supreme Court for the settled rule 
which immunises county school boards against liability 
for torts committed by their agents or employees. We 
are compelled to the view, however, that such conflict 
in judicial opinion does not in any manner alter the 
established law of this jurisdiction (pp. 767-768). 
The court also added that if a change in the long 
established rule of immunity which prevailed in the State 
of Florida was to be made, it would have to come as the 
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result of either constitutional amendment, by enactment of 
appropriate legislation, or both. 
Whether the state board of higher education had been 
negligent in failing to provide and maintain handrails on 
the stairway and to provide ushers to supervise and 
control the crowd was the issue in Bacon v. Harris (1960). 
The plaintiff had paid admission to a basketball game at 
the University of Oregon. During half-time, she started 
down the stairs to go to the refreshment stand. She was 
jostled by another person and fell near the top of the 
stairs to the bottom, sustaining severe injuries. 
The court held that the state board of higher 
education was an agency of the state "vested with corporate 
powers and was a quasi-corporation public in nature..." 
(p. 474) to which the state had not waived its immunity. 
Therefore, the court held that a case could not be 
maintained against the state board of education. 
The issue in Ludwjg v. Board of Education (1962) was 
whether the school board was liable in damages for the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Henry Ludwig had 
purchased a ticket to a high school football game between 
two Chicago teams. He was injured when he fell on the 
stairs of the football stadium. The plaintiff, a paying 
spectator, alleged that the football game conducted by 
the defendant for profit was a private, proprietary 
undertaking and not related to any educational or 
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governmental function of the defendant school board. 
Thfi rsourt noted that the long-established rule in 
Illinois exempting school districts from responding in 
damages for all torts and negligence had been swept away 
in 1959 by Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 
302. However, Ludwig could not benefit from the decision 
in Molitor since its application was restricted to 
prospective cases and his injury had occurred in 1956. 
Although the Molitor decision "...dismissed as immaterial 
any distinction between governmental or proprietary 
functions, ...the law prior [to that decision] established 
the board of education's immunity from liability for torts 
arising out of proprietary as well as purely governmental 
fuctions" (p. 34). Therefore, the defendant board of 
education prevailed under the doctrine of governmental 
immunity. 
In Coughlon v. Iowa High School Athletic Association 
(1967), a spectator was injured when the bleachers 
collapsed at a high school basketball tournament. Action 
was brought against the athletic association and several 
public school districts. The court ruled that the 
individual school districts were quasi-corporations and, 
therefore, entitled to all the benefits of governmental 
immunity. As to the defendant Iowa High School Athletic 
Association, however, the court ruled that "... where...an 
unincorporated association exercises the rights and powers 
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of a legal entity, to the extent reasonably and legally 
possible, [it should] be held to assume corresponding 
duties and obligations. Anything else would be unjust and 
unreasonable" (p. 663). 
In addition to the 9 athletic cases just presented in 
which the defendants prevailed on the basis of governmental 
immunity, there were seven other spectator cases in which 
the courts ruled for the defendants, finding no negligence 
on their part. The issue in Ingerson v. Shattuck School 
(1931) was whether the defendant school was negligent in 
not fencing or otherwise protecting the football field and 
in not warning spectators to stand farther back from the 
boundary lines of the field. The plaintiff was a paying 
spectator at a football game in which her son was playing. 
The game was "not an important one, attracting much public 
interest" (p. 668). There was no rope or fence around the 
field although it was marked by plainly visible white chalk 
lines. Although bleachers were available, spectators were 
not required to sit there but had been warned to stay 
outside the playing field area. Mrs. Ingerson was standing 
from two to five feet outside the chalk line on the side 
of the field when two players rolled across the sideline 
and struck her, resulting in one of her legs being 
fractured. 
The court held that Shattuck School, a private 
institution, was not negligent. It was not customary at 
97 
this school or at smaller schools or colleges in that part 
of the state to fence or rope off the playing field. 
It was sometimes done when important games, drawing 
crowds, were held. Inferentially such barriers were 
used more to keep the spectators off the playing 
field than for the purpose of protecting spectators. 
A rope around the field would not prevent players 
from rolling under it, and a fence in front of a 
spectator, if the players crashed into it, might 
result in greater injury than if there were no 
fence (p. 669). 
The defendant owed the plaintiff the duty of exercising 
ordinary or reasonable care under the circumstances 
shown. "There was no such dangerous situation or apparent 
danger as to require a high degree of care" (p. 668). The 
injury to the plaintiff "...was not one which the defendant 
could or did anticipate or foresee" (p. 668). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had attended 
three football games prior to the one in which she was 
injured and that it was more or less a common occurrence 
for football players to go out of bounds during play, the 
court did not hold as a matter of law that the plaintiff 
had assumed the risk of any injury resulting. 
A similar ruling was handed down in Juntila v. 
Everett School Dist. No. 24 (1935) in that the school 
district was not found to be negligent. Unlike Ingerson 
(1931), however, the plaintiff in the instant case was 
contributorily negligent. 
Juntila, a season ticket holder, had attended a high 
school football game. Since all the seats were filled, he 
and several others stood on the top seat of the bleachers. 
After standing there for a short time, he and five other 
spectators sat on the rail which gave way under their 
weight. Juntila, along with several of the others, fell 
to the ground behind the bleachers, and he sustained 
serious injuries. The railing did not break, but the 
six-penny nails pulled loose from the weight of the 
spectators. 
The court held that the school district was not 
negligent and that Juntila was contributorily negligent. 
Juntila was 18 years old, of mature judgment, and fully 
able to appreciate the risk he took in sitting on the 
railing. The railing clearly was not intended as a seat. 
"The nails were sufficient to hold the railing in place as 
a guard, but not as a seat" (p. 615). 
The respondent owed him the duty to exercise all 
proper precaution to maintain the field and bleachers 
in a reasonably safe condition for the use to which 
they might rightly be put. But respondent was not an 
insurer of his safety. It owed him only the degree 
of care that would be expected of an ordinarily 
prudent person in its position (p. 615). 
In Colclough v. Orleans Parish School Board (1964), 
the plaintiff, a former college football player, went to a 
city park to watch his high school son participate in a 
football scrimmage. The field on which the scrimmage was 
held had no markings of the boundary lines, no seats for 
spectators, and no barriers around the playing field. 
Along with about 25 to 30 other spectators, Colclough 
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stood approximately 10 to 12 feet from what would have 
been one of the boundary lines of the field. During an 
end run, five of the athletes ran beyond the unmarked 
boundary line of the field and knocked the plaintiff to 
the ground resulting in the injuries of which he 
complained. 
The court ruled that Colclough had no right of 
recovery since he had asssumed the risk of being struck by 
players going out of bounds. 
It is knowledge common to all who have watched 
football games, or viewed such games on television, 
that ofttimes as a result of momentum generated in 
executing plays, players cannot avoid running beyond 
the limits of the playing field and as a result 
accidents may occur (p. 649). 
A 67-year-old grandmother was seriously and 
permanently injured while a spectator at a high school 
football game to which she had been invited by her 
grandson, a player on one of the teams (Perry v. Seattle 
School District No. 1. 1965). She had paid no admissison 
to the game which was between the third teams of the two 
schools. She had attended only one other football game at 
which she sat in the grandstand. 
The only bleachers available were on the other team's 
side of the field. The plaintiff stood on her grandson's 
side of the field with other spectators. Officials from 
the defendant school did request that the spectators stay 
on the outside of the sideline of the playing field. The 
crowd was about four persons deep. A player carrying the 
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ball was hit by two opposing players, was knocked out of 
bounds, and hit the plaintiff who was thrown to the 
ground. She was talking to her daughter at the time and 
did not see the player until just before she was struck. 
Relying on both Intferson (1931) and Colclough (1964), 
the court ruled that the school district was not negligent 
for the injury occurring to the plaintiff and that she 
voluntarily assumed the risk of being injured by standing 
close to the sidelines. Similar to the direction of the 
court in Ingerson (1931), the court ruling on the instant 
case commented: 
The applicable rule as to the duty of the school 
district is that it must observe...that degree of 
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances 
demand. The 'circumstances' would seem to require, 
where large crowds attend because of interest in the 
outcome of the game, a higher degree of care than in 
more informal second and third-team and intramural 
contests where no admission is charged and those who 
attend are largely relatives or personal friends of 
the participants. Here there is no profit and the 
purpose is to make possible a wider participation in 
the sport (p. 593). 
In Turner v. Caddo Parish School Board (1968), a case 
noticeably similar to Perry (1965), school authorities 
were not negligent for failing to provide barriers to keep 
spectators a safe distance from the playing field or for 
failing to give special warning to those attending a 
junior high school football game. 
A 71-year-old grandmother went to the game in which 
one of her grandsons was playing and for which no admission 
was charged. She attended the game with another grandson 
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at his invitation. There were no bleachers on which to 
sit. Although there were no physical barriers to separate 
the field from spectator areas, there were white chalk 
lines to serve as restraining lines behind which spectators 
were supposed to stand. In addition to marking the 
restraining lines for spectators, school officials had 
assigned two teachers to effect spectator control. Prior 
to the plaintiff's injury, the teachers had moved along 
the sidelines asking the spectators to move behind the 
restraining line. 
During the early part of the fourth quarter when a 
player carrying the ball and two tacklers went out of 
bounds, the spectators standing in front of the plaintiff 
moved back to get out of the way, ran into her, and 
knocked her down. She claimed that she had never seen a 
football game and that the school board was negligent for 
her injury. 
Relying on Colclough (1964) and Perry (1965), the 
court held that the defendant school board had not been 
negligent. Moreover, the court agreed with the 
observations of the Supreme Court of Washington in Perry: 
Whether or not the plaintiff was as completely 
ignorant of the game of football as her testimony 
indicates, is not controlling on the issue of 
negligence. The question of the ordinary care 
required of the defendant must, to some extent, be 
predicated upon the knowledge of the ordinary 
person of the risk involved. As Prosser suggests, 
the owner of a hockey rink is not required to ask 
each entering patron whether he has ever witnessed 
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a hockey game before, but can reasonably assume that 
the danger of being hit by the puck is understood and 
accepted (Perry v. Seattle School District No. 1. 
1965, p. 593). 
In Mo vale v. City of Del ay an (1966), the issue was 
whether the school district had a duty within the Wisconsin 
safe-place statute to construct, repair, or maintain the 
bleachers so as to render them safe. Having paid admission 
to a high school football game, Mrs. Novak sat on the top 
row of the bleachers. When she and her husband stood up 
during the game on the footboard of the bleachers in order 
to see better, the footboard gave way and the two fell to 
the ground. Mrs. Novak sustained injuries. 
Although the field and bleachers were owned by the 
city of Delavan, the school district used the field for 
its seven football games. The city was responsible for 
preparing the field for the games and cleaning up after 
each game. The school district provided ticket sellers 
and takers for each game, employed people to handle the 
parking lot, assigned teachers to keep students off the 
field, and lined the field. Employees of the school 
district did not inspect the bleachers nor perform repairs 
on them. City employees performed all maintenance and 
repairs on the bleachers. According to the park foreman, 
city employees conducted regular inspections before and 
after every game to determine the safety of the bleachers. 
The court ruled that the school district was not 
negligent. Even though the school district rented the 
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field for its seven games, it did not have control or 
custody of the bleachers nor an obligation to repair them. 
The school district was not liable under the safe-place 
statute for Mrs. Novak's injuries. 
The issue in Akins v. Glens Falls City School District 
(1981) was whether the school district, having provided 
protective screening behind the home plate area, was 
liable for negligence for injuries sustained by a spectator 
as a result of her having been struck by a foul ball while 
she was standing in an unscreened section of the field. 
The backstop behind home plate was 24 feet high and 50 
feet long, located 60 feet behind home plate, and 
positioned in front of the bleachers which could seat 
approximately 120 adults. Two 3-foot high chain link 
fences ran from each end of the backstop along the 
baselines to a distance approximately 60 feet behind first 
and third bases. 
The plaintiff arrived after the game had started and 
chose to watch the game from a position behind the 3-foot 
high fence along the third baseline. There were no 
seating facilities for spectators along the baselines. 
There was no proof that the bleachers behind home plate 
were filled. As the plaintiff was standing behind the 
3-foot fence along the third baseline, a foul ball hit her 
in the eye causing serious and permanent injury. 
The court ruled that there was no negligence on the 
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part of the school district. Having adequately screened 
the area behind home plate, the defendant had fulfilled 
its duty to the plaintiff and could not be held negligent 
since she had elected to stand outside the screened area. 
The court also defined the duty of care an owner of a 
baseball facility owes spectators. 
The proprietor of a ball park need only provide 
screening for the area of the field behind home plate 
where the danger of being struck by a ball is the 
greatest. Moreover, such screening must be of 
sufficient extent to provide adequate protection for 
as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to 
desire such seating in the course of an ordinary 
game. In so holding, we merely recognize the 
practical realities of this sporting event (p. 533). 
In summary, recovery was denied in 23 of the school-
sponsored athletic cases on the basis of governmental 
immunity or no negligence on the part of the defendants. 
Recovery was allowed, however, in 6 cases. 
Recovery allowed. The plaintiff was allowed recovery 
in three participant cases and three spectator cases. The 
issue in Scott v. State (1956), the first participant 
case, was whether New York Teachers College was negligent 
in maintaining a flag pole in right field of its baseball 
field. Seventeen-year-old James Scott, a student at the 
college, was playing right field when the injury occurred. 
In running far out in right field while attempting to 
catch a fly ball hit by a member of the opposing team, the 
plaintiff collided with a metal flag pole and sustained 
serious injury. 
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Prior to the spring of 1950 (when the injury 
occurred), the baseball field had been laid out so that 
the flag pole was located directly on the left field foul 
line. In 1950, the baseball field was relocated in such a 
way that the flag pole came within the boundaries of the 
playing field, 12 to 15 feet inside the foul line. 
The court ruled that the baseball field at the 
college was negligently maintained by the State of New 
York, its officers, and employees, and that the flag pole, 
as situated, did not constitute an ordinary and inherent 
risk in the game of baseball. Even though Scott knew the 
location of the flag pole, the court held that 
... it could reasonably have been foreseen by a 
reasonably prudent person that a baseball player, 
especially an outfielder, running to catch a long 
fly would direct his primary attention to the ball in 
the air and would be unaware of obstructions in his 
path, although the location of such obstructions was 
actually known to him (p. 618). 
Consequently, Scott was not contributorily negligent; nor 
did he assume the risk of running into the flag pole 
notwithstanding his knowledge of its existence and 
location. 
In Thomas v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church (1979), 
the plaintiff was a participant in an interschool varsity 
basketball game. Howard Thomas was lunging for a ball 
going out of bounds in the parorchis], high school gymnasium 
when he struck a glass panel located within six feet of the 
boundary line of the basketball court. The glass shattered 
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and Thomas fell severing an artery and sustaining extensive 
lacerations on both arms. Two other of the glass panels 
had been broken previously and had been replaced with 
plywood. 
As a business invitee of St. Mary's, Thomas was 
entitled to rely on the assumption that St. Mary's would 
exercise reasonable care for his safety. The court ruled 
that the parochial school had breached its duty to maintain 
its premises in a reasonably safe condition for use 
consistent with the purpose. 
Patricia Lamphear, a member of the women's 
intercollegiate softball team at Delhi Agricultural and 
Technical College, was injured while sliding into third 
base on a makeshift softball diamond (Lamphear v. State. 
1982). The regular playing" field had been rendered 
unplayable because of heavy rain. The plaintiff caught 
her left shoe in a depression close to third base. The 
hole was approximately one foot wide and three to four 
inches deep and was concealed by grass. 
The plaintiff established a prima facie case of 
negligence. Since Lamphear had no prior knowledge of the 
depression and at the moment of the injury was engaged in 
a normal activity associated with playing softball, the 
court concluded that her actions did not rise to the level 
of culpable conduct. 
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When the legislature enacted the comparative 
negligence statute in 1975, it abolished the doctrines 
of asssumption of risk and contributory negligence as 
absolute bars to a plaintiff's recovery. Currently, 
and at the time of the accident at issue here, 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence are 
termed 'culpable conduct' and, if proven, operate only 
to proportionately reduce a plaintiff's recovery. As 
an affirmative defense, assumption of risk is 
considered only after the plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case of negligence, as was done here 
(P. 72). 
Since Lamphear did not know that the hole was there and 
sliding into a base was a normal part of the game of 
softball, the court concluded that her actions did not 
rise to the level of culpable conduct so as to invoke the 
provisions of the comparative negligence statute and ruled 
in her favor. 
The issue in the first spectator case in athletics in 
which recovery was allowed was whether the school district 
which had leased its football stadium was immune from 
liability for injuries sustained as the result of the 
condition of the stadium fSawava v. Tucson High School 
District No. 1. 1955). A spectator who had paid admission 
to a high school football game, Sawaya fell to the ground 
from the grandstand sustaining a fractured spine. He 
alleged negligence of the school district in allowing the 
railing through which he fell to become and remain in a 
condition of disrepair. 
The court ruled that where the school district had 
leased its stadium and received compensation, it had been 
exercising a proprietary function and was liable for 
108 
injuries to spectators as a result of its negligence in 
maintenance of the stadium. The court also commented on 
the affect of insurance on governmental immunity. 
We believe that the majority of text book fsicl 
writers are of the view that such a doctrine has no 
application in this country especially in view of 
the fact that the reasons assigned by the courts for 
its perpetuation no longer exist. This seems to be 
especially true since liability insurance is available 
to state government and to its subdivisions for the 
protection of persons who may become injured as a 
result of a tort committed by an officer, agent or 
employee of government (p. 107). 
The issue in Board of Education of Richmond County v. 
Fredericks (1966) was whether the school board had been 
negligent in maintaining the stadium in which Fredericks 
fell and whether the athletic director of the defendant 
board of education had notice of the defect. While a 
spectator at a high school football game, the plaintiff 
fell from the bleachers in Richmond Academy's football 
stadium after he stumbled over a loose bolt and loose 
board. 
Evidence indicated that the athletic director was 
familiar with the stadium, that he had inspected the 
stadium two or three times each year, and that the board 
deteriorated slowly over a period of time rather than 
overnight. Ruling that the athletic director knew the 
condition of the seats at the time of the accident and 
thus had notice of the defect, the court held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to recover. 
In Ben.iamin v. State (1982), the 11-year-old plaintiff 
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was a paying spectator at an ice hockey game at a facility 
located on the State University of New York at Oswego 
campus. While seated on the sidelines behind a protective 
fence and 10 to 15 feet away from the nearest players' 
bench, the plaintiff was struck by a puck. The errant 
puck went through an open area in front of the players' 
bench, passed behind the protective fence, and struck 
Benjamin in the head causing serious injury. 
The court held that Benjamin had a right to assume 
that reasonable care had been taken to protect spectators 
in the seating area and that the state's failure to do so 
constituted negligence. Such negligence was a substantial 
factor in bringing about Benjamin's injuries. The court 
also was of the opinion that the lack of fencing in front 
of the players' bench constituted a dangerous condition 
and that the risk of injury to spectators was foreseeable. 
Moreover, the court held that "... a reasonably prudent 
person of the plaintiff's years, intelligence and degree 
of development would not fully have appreciated the 
danger..." (p. 332). Therefore, the plaintiff could not 
have been said to assume the risk nor have been- aware of 
the risk so as to be contributorily negligent. 
An analysis of the 29 cases in school-sponsored 
athletic programs in which the condition of facilities was 
alleged as the proximate cause of injury revealed that 
recovery was allowed in only 6 cases. In those 6, the 
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defendants were liable in 4 cases through breach of duty in 
negligent maintenance of facilities and in 1 case for 
failure to remedy a defective condition after constructive 
notice. In the other case in which the plaintiff was 
allowed recovery, the school was conducting a proprietary 
function and, therefore, was not protected by governmental 
immunity. 
Physical Education 
Description of Elements 
There were 17 cases in physical education programs in 
which the condition of facilities was alleged as the 
proximate cause of injury to participants in school-
sponsored physical'education programs. Each case was 
analysed to determine the age, role, sex, and sport or 
activity involved. The occurrence of these elements is 
depicted in Table 8. 
With the exception of three cases (Bush v. City of 
Norwalk. 1937; Freund v. Oakland Board of Education. 1938; 
Truelove v. Wilson. 1981), injuries reported in physical 
education cases involved older individuals. These three 
cases involved injury to an 8-year-old student, a junior 
high school student, and an elementary school student, 
respectively. 
With the exception of the three cases previously 
cited and where age could be discerned, injuries reported 
in physical education cases involved a teacher and older 
Ill 
Table 8 
Elements in Cases of Alleged Unsafe 
Facilities in Physical Education 
Elements 
Case and Year Age Role Sex Sport/ 
Activity 
Bradley v. Brd. of Ed. 0 P M Field dodge-
(1937) ball 
Bush v. City of Norwalk Y P M Balance beam 
(1937) 
Freund v. Oakland Brd. Y P F — 
(1938) Locker fell 
Cambareri v. Brd. of Ed. 0 P M Relay race 
(1940) 
Read v. Sch. Dist. 0 P M Touch foot­
(1941) ball 
Bauer v. Brd. of Ed. 0 P M Three-man 
(1955) basketball 
Hanna v. State 0 P M Baseball 
(1965) 
Cumberland Coll. v. Gaines 0 P F Game 
(1968) 
Siau v. Rapides Parish 0 P M Running— 
(1972) 880 event 
Driscol v. Delphi 0 P F Run to dress­
(1973) ing room 
Shelton v. Planet 0 P F Run and turn 
(1973) maneuver 
Dobbins v. Brd of Ed. 0 P F Running 
(1975) 
Zawadski v. Taylor - P M Indoor 
(1976) tennis 
Ardoin v. Evangeline 0 P M Softball 
(1979) 
Truelove v. Wilson Y P F Soccer 
(1981) 
Wilkinson v. Hartford 0 P M Relay race 
(1982) 
Hutt v. Etowah Brd. of Ed. 0 P F Basketball 
(1984) 
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students. A physical education teacher sustained injury 
in Shelton v. Planet Insurance Company (1973), and college 
students were injured in Cumberland College v. Gaines 
(1968) and Hanna v. State (1965). Other than the one case 
in which age was not identified (Zawadzki v. Taylor. 
1976), all other cases (10) involved high school students. 
All physical education cases involved injuries to 
participants, and 10 of the 17 were males. Of the 6 
females injured during actual "activity", 4 were running 
at the time of injury. 
Legal Analysis 
In analysing cases in which participants were injured 
in school-sponsored physical education programs and 
negligence was alleged due to unsafe conditions of 
facilities, cases are categorised as those in which 
recovery to the injured party was either denied jor allowed. 
The circumstances giving rise to each case, issues 
involved, decision rendered, and legal principles applied 
are included for each case. When any of the other facility 
cases which have been reported are relied on as precedent 
for the instant case, such will be noted. 
Recovery denied. There were four physical education cases 
in which the courts ruled in favor of the defendant school 
districts on the basis of governmental immunity. The 
issues in each of these four cases was whether the 
defendant was exempt from liability on the basis of 
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governmental immunity. 
In Dobbins v. Board of Education of Henry Hudson 
Regional High School (1974), a 16-year-old high school 
student was participating in physical fitness tests as a 
member of her physical education class. The specific 
issue in this case was whether the safe-place exemption to 
immunity should be applied. 
The teacher instructed the class to run in groups of 
five to eight on a macadam driveway around a grass island 
located in a parking lot. In running the designated 
course, the plaintiff slipped on loose gravel, fell to the 
pavement, and seriously injured her knee. 
The decision favoring the defendant school district 
was based on a New Jersey statute. 
No school district shall be liable for injury to the 
person from the use of any public grounds, buildings 
or structures, any law to the contrary notwithstanding 
(P. 60). 
Since the Supreme Court of New Jersey viewed the accident 
as one which occurred from the use of the property and not 
as the result of a defect in the maintenance of the 
parking lot, it barred recovery on the basis of this 
immunity statute. 
As with Dobbins (1974), the issue in Zawadski v. 
Taylor (1976) was whether the public building exception 
was applicable. During an indoor tennis class, a ball 
struck by another student (Taylor) hit the plaintiff in 
the eye. The plaintiff was playing on one of the courts 
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laid out on the gymnasium floor, and Taylor was playing on 
the other court immediately adjacent to the plaintiff's 
court. No nets separated the two courts. The plaintiff 
alleged that a dangerous or defective condition existed in 
the school gymnasium because of the absence of safety nets 
separating the two tennis courts. 
The court held that the statutory public building 
exception to governmental immunity was not applicable 
since the missing equipment (nets) was not and never 
would be a permanent part of the building. In rendering 
its decision, the court also gave examples of "failure to 
provide" which would fall within the statutory exception. 
...the failure to provide a handrail on a stairway, a 
door on an elevator, a locking device on a window. 
Further, the failure to provide must refer to 
something inanimate. For example, an allegation that 
the plaintiff's teacher should have stationed himself 
between the tennis courts in order to deflect 
inaccurate shots would not survive a proper motion for 
accelerated judgment by defendant school district 
(P. 164). 
Taylor, the other defendant, was not a party to the appeal 
since he would not be affected by the governmental immunity 
question. 
A third case in which the statutory public building 
exception to governmental immunity was not applicable was 
Hutt v. Etowah County Board of Education. 1984. A high 
school student was participating in a basketball activity 
in the gymnasium when her hand struck and shattered the 
glass window in a door located close to the edge of the 
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basketball court. 
The issue in this case was whether the defendant 
school board had failed to provide safe gymnasium 
facilities. The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that due 
to sovereign immunity the school board, as a function of 
the State of Alabama, was not subject to tort action. 
In Truelove v. Wilson (1981), an elementary school 
student was fatally injured when a metal soccer goal fell 
and struck her as she was kneeling to tie her shoe during 
a physical education class. The issues were whether the 
school district was maintaining a nuisance and whether the 
15 defendants named by her parents were entitled to the 
governmental immunity defense. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that the soccer 
goal did not constitute a nuisance. Additionally, the 
county board of education, county school district, and 
individual defendants who were school employees and 
members of the county board of education were entitled to 
governmental immunity. They were entitled to such immunity 
since they were acting in "...their public capacities in 
discretionary roles and their acts were within the scope 
of their authority and they acted without wilfulness, 
malice or corruption" (p. 558). 
There were seven physical education cases in which 
the courts ruled for the defendants, finding no negligence 
on their part. In two of these cases, the plaintiffs' 
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negligence was the proximate cause of injuries sustained. 
In Hanna v. State (1965), a college participant in a 
baseball game announced that he would umpire while he 
was acting as a substitute. While umpiring behind the 
portable backstop, the plaintiff was struck in the face by 
a foul tipped ball and the glasses he was wearing were 
shattered. The ball did not go through the net, but the 
net was slack enough to give and allow the ball to strike 
him. 
Although Hanna had received a typed* outline of 
instructions including reference to the use of protective 
equipment at the beginning of the baseball unit, he was 
not wearing an available guard over his glasses. Moreover, 
the teacher previously had instructed the students to 
stand far enough behind the portable backstop to avoid 
being hit by a foul tip. Hanna had been crouched about a 
foot from the net umpiring for about 15 minutes prior to 
his injury. During that time, three or four foul tips had 
struck the net. 
The court held that the condition of the net was not 
the cause of the injury. Nor did the use of a portable 
backstop in a baseball game in a physical education class 
constitute negligence on the part of the state or its 
employees. The court did find that the plaintiff was 
aware that there purposely was slack in the netting and 
was charged with the knowledge that to stand with his face 
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too close to the net would be dangerous. His failure to 
maintain a safe distance from the net was the proximate 
cause of the accident resulting in his eye injury and 
precluded recovery. 
Siau v. Rapides Parish School Board (1972) was the 
second physical education case in which the plaintiff's 
actions were the proximate cause of the injury he 
sustained. Therefore, he was denied recovery. William 
Siau's high school physical education class was engaged in 
running an 880-yard track event. Since Siau had not 
dressed properly for class, he was not allowed to run in 
the event and had been instructed to sit in the bleachers. 
When he learned that he could not participate in softball 
unless he also ran, Siau came down out of the bleachers, 
crossed the starting point on the track, went through the 
gate onto the grassy area inside the track proper, and 
started to run. Another student, who was working with the 
javelin, had finished with the javelin and placed it in or 
on the ground in such a way that the tip was approximately 
three feet above the ground. 
One of the coaches saw Siau as he started to run 
along the inside of the four-foot fence (between the track 
and the field) ahead of the students on the track. 
Although the coach called out to Siau to stop, the 
plaintiff called back that he would run anyway. While 
looking to the side to watch the students on the cinder 
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track, Siau impaled himself on the javelin. He was not 
wearing his glasses without which he was unable to 
distinguish faces at a distance of 20 to 25 feet. 
The court ruled in favor of the school board. Since 
Siau was running in an area not utilized for that purpose, 
should not have been participating because he was 
inappropriately dressed, had been told to stop, had failed 
to look straight ahead in the direction in which he 
was running, and had been running too fast in regard to his 
limited vision without his glasses, he was contributorily 
negligent in failing to exercise the care required for 
his own safety. 
In Cambareri v. Board of Education of Albany (1940), 
the issue was whether the defendant school board was 
negligent in maintaining a slippery gymnasium floor 
which was unsafe for the physical education activity 
conducted on it. Anthony Cambareri was a 15-year-old high 
school student who was "...clumsy, awkward and ungainly and 
weighed upwards of 225 pounds" (Cambareri v. Board of 
Education of City of Albany. 1936, p. 893). As a member 
of his physical education class engaged in a tumbling 
relay race, the plaintiff was to run across the gymnasium 
floor, execute a forward roll on a mat, regain his footing 
and run toward a pole, touch the pole, and return to 
another member of his team who would continue the race. 
Cambareri claimied that after he had executed the forward 
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roll and regained his footing that the mat slipped, 
causing him to sustain floor burns on his right knee and 
injury to his left leg. 
The court ruled for the defendant since there was no 
showing that the school board failed to exercise reasonable 
care in furnishing a reasonably safe place. 
The defendant was not the insurer of plaintiff's 
safety. Common experience teaches us that innumerable 
hazards surround the individual and injuries thereby 
are suffered despite the exercise of proper care and 
for which no real liability attaches to any one fsicl. 
Slipping and falls frequently occur on floors when no 
implication of carelessness arises.... This was an 
ordinary floor with an ordinary mat placed thereon. 
The hazard was .the usual and ordinary hazard of 
children encountered in running, exercise, and play 
(p. 894). 
A similar ruling of no negligence was handed down in 
Read v. School Dist. No. 211 of Lewis County (1941). The 
issue in this case was whether the condition of the 
gymnasium floor was the proximate cause of injury. The 
gymnasium was old with concrete walls and a wooden floor 
built over a concrete base. The floor had a tendency to 
vibrate when students ran across it. In two places in one 
area of the gymnasium, the boards of the floor connected 
in such a manner that the edges of the boards were slightly 
raised. 
Ray Read was a high school student participating in a 
variation of touch football in his physical education 
class. The object of the game, played with a soccer ball, 
was to score a goal by reaching and touching the end of 
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the gymnasium wall at the far end of the floor. As the 
plaintiff bent over to pick up the ball, a number of other 
students ran into him and one of them struck him in the 
back. The plaintiff stated that he did not know whether 
any of those who hit him tripped over the boards. He also 
stated that the other boys might have run into him to keep 
from running into the rough concrete walls. 
The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove 
that the defendant school district, through its agent the 
physical education teacher, was guilty of any negligence 
which caused the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. In 
the court's opinion, the injury resulted from a pure 
accident and could not be attributed to any act or omission 
on the part of the school district or its agent. 
Actionable negligence was also lacking in Cumberland 
College v. Gaines (1968). Inea Gaines was a college 
student in a physical education class when she fell while 
participating in a game which required her to run across 
the gymnasium floor. She alleged that her fall occurred 
as the result of a sticky liquid substance on the floor. 
The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to show 
that the college had created the condition or had notice of 
its condition. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence 
to demonstrate negligence on the part of the college. 
The issues in Driscol v. Delphi Community School Corp. 
(1973) were whether the defendants were negligent in 
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(a) permitting too many girls (45) in the gymnasium class, 
(b) failing to provide adequate showers (6) for the class, 
and (c) failing to provide sufficient time for the girls 
to shower. Denise Driscol was a member of the girls' 
physical education class which had one end of the gymnasium 
while a boys' class was conducted on the other end of the 
gymnasium floor. The two classes were separated by a 
canvas curtain. Approximately five minutes before the 
time the class was scheduled to end, the girls were 
dismissed by their teacher. In running toward the curtain 
to get to the dressing room, the plaintiff fell when her 
feet got tangled with a girl behind her. Several other 
girls fell on top of her, and she sustained the injuries of 
which she complained. 
In ruling for the defendants (physical education 
teacher and school district), the court addressed each of 
the three complaints: (a) the teacher had no part in 
determining the class siae and, therefore, was not 
negligent for allowing too many girls to be in the class; 
(b) there was no proof that the class siae, crowded 
condition of the dressing room, or time allowed for 
showering were conditions created by discretionary acts or 
omissions; and (c) the teacher's practice of not letting 
her class go until after the boys' class had been dismissed 
was reasonable in that this procedure prevented injurious 
collisions if the girls had gone through the boys' 
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territory. 
The last case in which the court found no negligence 
on the part of the defendants involved injury to a physical 
education teacher (Shelton v. Planet Insurance Company. 
1973). The issue in this case was whether the 
superintendent and other unneuned executive officers of the 
school board failed to provide the plaintiff with safe 
working conditions. Action was brought against the 
insurer of the defendants. 
Carol Shelton taught her physical education classes 
on the school's parking area due to the lack of space 
elsewhere at the school. The parking area, which was 
asphalt surfaced, was partially covered with loose gravel 
and contained many potholes. As the plaintiff teacher was 
demonstrating a maneuver to her students about how to run 
and execute a turn at the same time, she slipped on the 
loose gravel and fell into one of the holes sustaining the 
injury of which she complained. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that action 
could not be maintained against the defendants. The 
school board, as the decision-making body, had the sole 
authority to approve spending public funds for the 
improvement, repair, and renovation of school property. 
Since the superintendent or individual members of the 
board could not take such action as individuals, there was 
no cause of action. 
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There were 11 cases in school-sponsored physical 
education programs in which recovery was denied. In 4 
cases, the courts ruled in favor of the defendants on the 
basis of governmental immunity. The defendants prevailed 
in the other 7 cases since there was no negligence on 
their part. In 2 of the 7 cases in which no negligence 
was found on the part of the defendants, the participants' 
negligence was the proximate cause of their injury. 
Recovery allowed. The plaintiff was allowed recovery 
in 6 of the 17 physical education cases. In gyadley. V,. 
Board of Education of Citv of Oneonta (1937), the issue was 
whether the board of education was negligent in failing to 
properly pad the walls of the gymansium. 
Franklin Bradley, a high school student, was 
participating in a game of field dodge ball in the school 
gymnasium when he slipped on the floor, fell, and struck a 
corner of a brick pilaster which projected from the wall. 
Corner boards had been installed originally to guard the 
pilaster, but they had come loose and pulled away, leaving 
the brick corner exposed and unguarded. 
The Court of Appeals of New York ruled for the 
plaintiff. It was a general custom in the area to protect 
dangerous projections in gymnasiums with mats or padding. 
The defendant board of education breached its duty of 
ordinary care by not providing mats or other protective 
measures to cover the brick column. 
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Whether the use of a balance beam on a slippery-
classroom floor constituted a nuisance was the issue in a 
1937 physical education case (Bush v. City of Norwalk). 
While walking along the balance beam under the supervision 
of his teacher, 8-year-old Richard Bush fell and was 
injured. The classroom floor had been oiled and was 
somewhat slippery. 
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff since the 
balance beam as used on the floor of the classroom was 
likely to slip and cause any child walking along it to 
fall. As a source of danger to the children using it, the 
beam constituted a nuisance and, therefore, the rule of 
governmental immunity was inapplicable. 
The plaintiff was allowed recovery also in Freund v. 
Oakland Board of Education (1938). The issue in this case 
was whether the steel lockers in the dressing room were 
negligently maintained. 
Phyllis Freund, a junior high school student, had gone 
into the dressing room after her physical education class. 
After they had dressed, the girls usually sat on benches 
which were about two feet in front of the lockers. After 
all of the students were seated, the usual procedure was 
for the teacher to excuse them for their next class. While 
waiting to be dismissed on the day of her injury, the 
plaintiff, who was sitting with her back to the lockers, 
was injured when several lockers fell on her. 
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The lockers were located on three sides of the 
dressing room. They stood upright against the walls and 
were nailed to the studding in the wall, although they 
would stand without being attached to the wall. The floor 
was level and in good condition, and the janitor had 
inspected the lockers twice that year (during the summer 
and during Christmas vacation). There was no evidence, 
however, that any test had been conducted to ascertain the 
results of six years of use or that the lockers had been 
installed properly or by a competent contractor. Although 
the janitor had inspected them twice that year, there was 
no evidence as to how they had been inspected. 
In ruling for the plaintiff, the court held that such 
a situation created a condition of danger which the board 
of education should have reasonably anticipated. The 
court cited Judson v. Grant Powder Company (1885) to 
support the view of a prima facie case, or one in which 
"the thing speaks for itself". 
When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under 
the management of the defendant, and the accident .is 
such as in the ordinary course of things does not 
happen if those who have the management use proper 
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence 
of explanation by the defendant, that the accident 
arose from the want of care (Judson v. Grant Powder 
Company. 1885, p. 1021). 
The issue in Bauer v. Board of Education of City of 
Mew York (1955) was whether the overcrowded condition of a 
gymnasium created a condition of danger. Students in the 
high school physical education class were required to 
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participate in some kind of activity, and the plaintiff 
Frank Bauer chose to play three-man basketball. As the 
plaintiff was shooting during the game, an opposing player 
who was trying to block Bauer's shot ran into Bauer. 
Testimony indicated that the opposing player struck the 
plaintiff as a result of a player on an adjacent court 
running onto the plaintiff's court. 
There were eight basketball playing areas in the 
gymnasium, and they were either adjacent to each other or 
the areas overlapped. All eight playing areas were in use 
at the time of Bauer's injury. Forty-eight boys were 
playing basketball in an area 80 feet long and 43 feet 
wide. 
The court held that such a situation created a 
condition of danger which the board of education should 
have reasonably anticipated. In ruling for the plaintiff, 
the court relied on Bradley v. Board of Education of City 
of Oneonta (1937), among other cases, in holding that the 
dangerous condition should have been foreseeable. 
The fifth physical education case in which recovery 
was allowed was Ardoin v. Evangeline Parish School Board 
(1979). The issue in this case was whether a piece of 
concrete on a playing field constituted such a hazardous 
condition that it was a breach of the school board's 
required standard of care to allow it to exist. 
David Ardoin was a high school student participating 
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in a Softball game when he was injured. While running 
from second to third base, the plaintiff tripped over a 
slab of concrete and hurt his right knee. The piece of 
concrete, which was at least 12 inches long by 12 inches 
wide and about 8 inches thick, was embedded in the ground 
between the two bases. A piece of the concrete stuck up 
about em inch above the ground. 
In ruling for the plaintiff, the court held that the 
school board had breached its required standard of care by 
allowing the piece of concrete to exist on the playing 
field. Although there was no evidence presented to the 
effect that the defendant school board had actual knowledge 
of the existence of the concrete, the court gave guidance 
on constructive knowledge. 
Constructive knowledge of a defect exists if it is 
so inherently dangerous that the school authorities 
should have known of it....This Softball field had 
been used throughout the year for physical education 
classes.... We believe that a reasonable examination 
of the area assigned for use as a softball diamond 
would have revealed this hasard.... Accordingly, we 
hold that the school authorities had constructive 
knowledge of this dangerous condition. They should 
have anticipated and discovered the potential danger 
and eliminated the harm (p. 374). 
The last case in which recovery was allowed was 
Wilkinson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 
(1982). The issues in this case were whether the teacher 
was negligent in failing to supervise the physical 
education class properly, the school board was negligent 
in maintaining a plate glass panel in the lobby of the 
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gymnasium, and the plaintiff's action was barred by his 
contributory negligence. 
As a member of his physical education class, 
David Wilkinson had been warned not to engage in horseplay 
in the gymnasium lobby while waiting his turn to run in a 
relay race. While engaging in an unsupervised race in the 
lobby to determine his position in the next race, he fell 
through a plate glass panel sustaining multiple cuts on 
his arms and legs. The panel through which the plaintiff 
fell was the original plate glass. The panel at the other 
end of the lobby was safety glass, the original glass 
having been replaced several years earlier after an 
incident in which a visiting coach walked through that 
glass panel. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the teacher 
was not negligent, that the school board was negligent, 
and that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. 
Relying on Ardoin v. Evangeline Parish School Board 
(1979), the court in the instant case elaborated on actual 
and constructive notice. 
A school board is liable if it has actual or 
constructive knowledge of a condition unreasonably 
hazardous to children under its supervision. The 
evidence in the record amply supports the conclusion 
that the school board had actual and constructive 
knowledge that the existence and maintenance of plate 
glass in the foyer of the gymnasium was dangerous 
(Wilkinson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. 
1982, p. 24). 
Having found that the school board was negligent, the 
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court considered whether the 12-year-old plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent. 
While a child of 12 can be guilty of contributory 
negligence, such a child's caution must be judged by 
his maturity and capacity to evaluate circumstances 
in each particular case, and he must exercise only 
the care expected of his age, intelligence and 
experience.... We consider it was normal behavior for 
12-year-old boys to do what [the plaintiff] and his 
teammates did under the circumstances despite a 
previous warning to refrain from engaging in horseplay 
in the lobby (p. 24). 
Analysis of the six preceding cases in which the 
injured participant was allowed to recover completes the 
second section of this chapter. The decision favoring the 
participant in five of the cases was based on negligent 
maintenance of facilities and on the defendant's 
maintenance of a nuisance in the sixth case. 
Intramurals 
Description of Elements 
There were two cases in intramural programs in which 
the condition of facilities was alleged as the proximate 
cause of injury to participants in school-sponsored 
intramural programs. Each case was analysed to determine 
the age, role, sex, and sport or activity involved. The 
occurrence of these elements is depicted in Table 9. 
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Table 9 
Elements in Cases of Alleged Unsafe 
Facilities in Intramurals 
Case and Year 
Domino v. Mercurio 
(1962) 
Scaduto v. State 
(1982) 
Elements 
Age Role Sex Sport/ 
Activity 
P M Softball 
0 P M  S o f t b a l l  
The older student in Scaduto v. State (1982) was a 
college student. The injured students in both cases were 
male participants engaged in softball games. 
Legal Analysis 
In analyzing the two cases in which participants were 
injured in school-sponsored intramural programs and 
negligence was alleged due to unsafe conditions of 
facilities, the cases are categorised as those in which 
recovery to the injured party was either denied allowed. 
The circumstances giving rise to each case, issues 
involved, decision rendered, and legal principles applied 
are included for each case. When any of the other facility 
cases which have been reported are relied on as precedent 
for the instant case, such will be noted. 
Recovery denied. Recovery was denied in one of the 
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intramural cases. The issue in Soaduto v. State (1982) 
was whether the State of New York exercised reasonable 
care in maintaining a Softball field with an unfenced 
drainage ditch alongside the field. 
Joseph Scaduto was a college student engaged in an 
intramural Softball game at the time of his injury. The 
field on which such a game usually was played was reserved 
for soccer. During the game, a batter hit the ball in 
foul territory outside the third baseline. While playing 
third base and attempting to catch the foul ball, Scaduto 
took four or five steps and fell into the drainage ditch 
located 15 to 20 feet from the baseline and parallel to 
it. The plaintiff was familiar with the field, and the 
ditch was visible to him. 
The court held that the State of Mew York did not 
breach its duty to Scaduto and that the drainage ditch was 
not an inherently dangerous condition of which he should 
have been aware. The court ruled that the duty owed to 
the plaintiff required only that the defendant exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent injury 
to those participating in the softball game. 
Relying on Akins v. Glen Falls City School District, a 
1981 New York athletic case in which a spectator at a high 
school baseball game was injured, the court in the instant 
case gave direction regarding the duty owed by holding that 
the duty did not encompass insurance of the safety of those 
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who played on the field. Additionally, the court 
elaborated on the assumption of risk doctrine. 
Intramural sporting activities involve inherent 
dangers to participants. This claimant, in electing 
to play, assumed the dangers of the game. This 
included the possibility of falling while in pursuit 
of the ball....[The State of New York] was not 
required to provide a terrain that was perfectly 
level. In the instant case, the record discloses 
that the drainage ditch was clearly visible to the 
players; that claimant was aware of its location; 
that its slope was gradual and not precipitous, and 
that it fulfilled a necessary function of drainage of 
the playing fields. We, therefore, conclude that the 
ditch did not constitute an inherently dangerous 
condition. The field of play was adequate for its 
intended purposes (p. 530). 
Recovery allowed. Recovery was allowed in the other 
intramural case. In Domino v. Mercurio (1962), the issue 
was whether the defendant supervisors of the game and the 
board of education were negligent in allowing a bench to 
be located so near the softball field that it constituted 
a hasard to the players. 
A crowd of approximately 125 spectators gathered to 
watch the intramural championship softball game. The 
softball field was screened by a fence, and the third 
baseline was located 27 feet from the nearest fence. 
Three benches were located in the softball area—one on 
the first base side of the field and the other two behind 
third base, positioned against the fence. About 100 of 
the spectators were on the third base side of the field. 
Although the benches supposedly were to be used by players 
waiting their turn at bat, the benches were filled by some 
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spectators and others stood around them. 
James Domino, the catcher on his team, ran to catch a 
foul ball hit into the crowd between home plate and third 
base. As he was looking up at the ball, he tripped over a 
spectator sitting on the bench, and broke his leg. The 
crowd had pushed the bench halfway between the fence and 
the third baseline. 
Named as defendants were the two teachers assigned to 
supervise the event (Mercurio and Walter) and the board of 
education. Walter served as the umpire and was charged 
with the duty of controlling the third base side of the 
field, and Mercurio supervised the crowd on the first base 
side. Although ropes were available which could have been 
used to restrain the crowd, the supervisors did not think 
it necessary to use them to control the crowd. Rather, it 
was Walter's practice to stop the game and make spectators 
move back to the fence when they moved out close enough to 
the foul line to endanger the players. Walter had stopped 
the game twice previously, in fact, to move the spectators 
back. The spectators had moved forward again toward the 
third baseline when Domino was injured. 
The court held that the two defendant supervisors 
were negligent in allowing the spectators to congregate • 
close to the third baseline, to push the bench into a 
dangerous position, and to surround the bench so that 
players might not see it when running after a foul ball. 
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The plaintiff Domino, however, was not contributorily 
negligent; nor did he assume the risk of his injury. 
According to the court, the difficult problem in this 
case was whether the defendant board of education was 
negligent. In deliberating whether the board of education 
was liable under the principle of respondeat superior for 
the negligence of its supervisors, the court reviewed the 
historical abolition of governmental and charitable 
immunity in the State of New York. After extensive 
deliberation, the court held that in regard to employees 
I 
of boards' of education and professional employees of 
'charitable institutions, the doctrine of respondeat 
superior applied to such employees. 
When...in 1929,...the Court of Claims Act was adopted 
and the State's immunity was abolished, the State 
became liable for the torts of its agents and 
employees to the same extent that a private person 
engaged in the same enterprise would be liable. Under 
this statute, the State became liable for the 
negligence of teachers in schools operated by the 
State (p. 1015). 
Consequently, the board of education in its relationship 
to the teachers employed by it in the instant case, was 
liable for the negligence of its teachers. 
Summary of Case Analyses 
After recapitulation of the number of reported 
facility cases and the decade, frequency, state, and 
school-sponsored sport, program within which they were 
litigated has been presented, the summary will be 
organised in two major sections: (a) cases in which 
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participants were injured in school-sponsored sport 
programs and (b) cases in which spectators were injured in 
school-sponsored sport programs. Observations regarding 
age, sex, and sport or activity will be summarised for each 
role. Subsequently, whether recovery was denied or allowed 
will be summarised according to the school-sponsored sport 
program in which the participants or spectators were 
injured. 
There were 48 reported cases in which the condition 
of facilities was alleged, as the proximate cause of injury 
in school-sponsored sport programs. As with equipment 
cases, the occurrence of reported facility cases has 
increased dramatically in the recent past with 31 of the 48 
cases from 1909 to 1984 having been reported in the past 24 
years. Throughout the years since the first reported 
facility case in the 1900s, 19 of the cases were reported 
in Louisiana (7) and New York (12). In the other 21 states 
in which facility cases were reported, the number of cases 
ranged from 1 to 3 cases. In comparison to the 29 reported 
facility cases in athletic programs and 17 in physical 
education programs, only 2 cases were reported in 
intramural programs (Table 10). 
In considering the 29 (of 48) cases in which 
participants were injured in school-sponsored sport 
programs, 24 of those individuals injured were at the high 
school level or beyond, and 3 were at the junior high 
Table 10 
Summary of Cases Involving Facilities in Athletics, 
< 
Physical Education, and Intramurals 
RECOVERY DENIED 
Page # of 
Analysis Case/Year 
School-Sponsored 
Sport Program Age Role Sex 
Legal 
Principle 
Legal 
Precedent* 
82 Mokovich 
(1929) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
0 P M Gov. immunity None 
84 Vargo 
(1980) 
Athletics 
(Wt. lifting) 
0 P M Gov. immunity None 
84 
< 
McGee 
(1962) 
Athletics 
(Baseball 
0 P M No negligence None 
86 Dudley 
(1974) 
Athletics 
(Baseball) 
0 P M No negligence None 
87 Nunez 
(1975) 
Athletics 
(Basketball) 
0 P M No negligence None 
88 McGovern 
(1976) 
Athletics 
(Basketball) 
0 P M No negligence None 
89 Studley 
(1982) 
Athletics 
(Basketball) 
0 P M No negligence None 
89 George 
(1909) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
- S M Gov. immunity None 
90 Uolznorth 
(1941) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
- S M Gov. immunity None 
90 • Rhoades Athletics - s 1? a n„ i «... 
/ 
89 George 
(1909) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
90 
90 
92 
92 
Holzworth 
(1941) 
Rhoades 
(1943) 
Reed 
(1949) 
Richards 
(1957) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
Athletics 
(Basketball) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
93 
94 
94 
Buck 
(1959) 
Bacon 
(1960) 
Ludwig 
(1962) 
Athletics 
(Baseball) 
Athletics 
(Basketball) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
95 
96 
97 
Coughlon 
(1967) 
Ingerson 
(1931) 
Juntila 
(1935) 
Athletics 
(Basketball) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
98 Colclough 
(1964) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
99 Perry 
(1965) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
100 Turner Athletics 
(1965) (Football) 
102 Novak Athletics 
(1966) (Football) 
103 Akins Athletics 
(1981) (Baseball) 
S M Gov. immunity None 
S M Gov. immunity None 
S F Gov. immunity None 
S M Gov. immunity None 
S M Gov. immunity None 
S F Gov. immunity None 
S F Gov. immunity None 
S M Gov. immunity None 
S - Gov. immunity None 
S F No negligence None 
S M No negligence None 
S M No negligence None 
S F No negligence Ingerson (1931) 
and Colclough 
• (1964) 
S F No negligence Colclough 
(1964) and 
Perry (1965) 
S F No negligence None 
S F No negligence None 

V r u u i u a n . ^  
100 Turner 
(1965) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
102 Novak 
(1966) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
103 Akins 
(1981) 
Athletics 
(Baseball) 
113 Dobbins 
(1974) 
Physical Educ, 
(Running) 
113 Zawadski 
(1976) 
Physical Educ. 
(Indoor tennis) 
114 Hutt 
(1984) 
Physical Educ. 
(Basketball) 
115 Truelove 
(1981) 
Physical Educ, 
(Soccer) 
116 Hanna 
(1965) 
Physical Educ, 
(Baseball) 
117 Siau 
(1972) 
Physical Educ. 
(880-yd. run) 
118, Cambareri 
(1940) 
Physical Educ 
(Relay race) 
119 Read 
(1941) 
120 Cumberland 
(1968) 
Physical Educ. 
(Touch football) 
Physical Educ. 
(Game) 
120 
122 
Driscol 
(1973) 
Shelton 
(1973) 
Physical Educ. 
(Run to dress­
ing room) 
Physical Educ. 
(Run and turn) 
131 Scaduto 
(1982) 
Intramurals 
(Softball) 
(1964) 
S F No negligence Colclough 
(1964) and 
Perry (1965) 
S F No negligence None 
S F No negligence None 
P F Gov. immunity None 
P M Gov. immunity None 
P F Gov. immunity None 
P F Gov. immunity None 
P M No negligence None 
P M No negligence None 
P M No negligence None 
P H No negligence None 
P F No negligence None 
P F No negligence None 
P F No negligence None 
P M No negligence Akins (1981) 

119 Read 
(1941) 
Physical Educ. 
(Touch football) 
0 P M No negligence None 
120 Cumberland 
(1968) 
Physical Gduc. 
(Game) 
0 P F No negligence None 
120 Driscol 
(1973) 
Physical Gduc. 
(Run to dress­
ing room) 
0 P F No negligence None 
122 Shelton 
(1973) 
Physical Educ. 
(Run and turn) 
0 P F No negligence None 
131 Scaduto 
(1982) 
Intramurals 
(Sof tball) 
0 P M No negligence Akins (1981) 
RECOVERY ALLOWED 
. -
Page # of 
Analysis Case/Year 
School-Sponsored 
Sport Program Age Role Sex 
Breach 
of Duty 
Legal 
Precedent* 
104 Scott 
(1956) 
Athletics 
(Baseball) 
0 P M Improper place­
ment of flag 
pole on field 
None 
105 Thomas v.St. 
Mary's (1979) 
Athletics 
(Basketball) 
0 P M Improper main­
tenance of 
glass panels 
in gymnasium 
None 
106 Lamohear 
(1982) 
Athletics 
(Softball) 
0 P • F Unsafe condi­
tion of hole 
in baseline 
None 
107 Sawaya 
(1955) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
S M Unsafe condi­
tion of sta­
dium railing 
(proprietary 
function) 
None 
108 Board v. 
Fredericks 
(1966) 
Athletics 
(Football) 
S M Dangerous con-
of loose bolt 
and board in 
stadium 
None 
108 Benj amin 
(1982) 
Athletics 
(Ice hockey) 
Y S M Improper pro­
tective 
None 
Q ^ r o o n l  n c r  f o r  

Fredericks (Football) 
(1966) 
108 Benj amin 
(1982) 
Athletics 
(Ice hockey) 
123 Bradley 
(1937) 
Physical Educ. 
(Field dodge 
ball) 
124 Bush 
(1937) 
Physical Educ. 
(Balance beam) 
124 Freund 
(1938) 
Physical Educ. 
(Locker fell) 
125 Bauer 
(1955) 
Physical Educ, 
(3-man 
basketball) 
126 Ardoin 
(1979) 
Physical Educ, 
(Softball) 
127 Wilkinson 
(1982) 
Physical Educ, 
(Relay race) 
132 Domino 
(1962) 
Intramurals 
(Softball) 
*Cases cited 
of in-jury. 
as precedent include only thos 
of loose bolt 
and board in 
stadium 
Y S M 
0 P M  
Y P M 
Y P F 
0 P M  
0 P M 
0 P M  
P M 
Improper pro­
tective 
screening for 
spectators 
Failure to pad 
gymnasium 
walls 
Improper con­
dition of 
balance beam 
as used 
(nuisance) 
Defective con­
dition of 
lockers 
Improper use 
of gymnasium 
space 
Hazardous con­
dition of 
concrete slab 
embedded in 
baseline 
Improper main­
tenance of 
glass panel 
in gymnasium 
lobby 
Dangerous 
position of 
bench near 
third 
baseline 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Bradley (1937) 
None 
Ardoin (1979) 
None 
involving facilities as the proximate cause 
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school level or below. Age was not discernible in two 
participant cases. 
There were 21 injured male participants and 8 injured 
female participants. One female participant was injured in 
the 10 athletic cases, 7 in the 17 physical education 
cases, and none in the 2 intramural cases. 
When reviewing activities in all three school-
sponsored sport programs in which participants were 
engaging, 18 of the activities involved traditional team 
sports or activities—football (2), baseball (4), soccer 
(1), basketball (6), softball (4), and field dodge ball 
(1). Other activities in which participants were involved 
included weight lifting (1), running (4), indoor tennis 
(1), relay races (2), playing a game (1), and walking a 
balance beam (1). 
In considering the 19 cases in school-sponsored 
athletic programs in which spectators were injured, age 
could not be discerned in 9 of the cases. Of the other 
spectator cases, nine of those injured were at the high 
school level or beyond and only one was at the junior high 
school level or below. 
There were 10 injured male spectators and 8 injured 
female spectators. Sex of the injured party could not be 
discerned in one of the spectator cases. 
When considering the athletic events at which these 
19 spectators were injured, 13 of the spectators were 
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observing football games; 3, basketball games; 2, baseball 
games; and 1, ice hockey. 
As presented in Table 10, recovery was denied in 35 
of the 48 cases. When considering cases in which 
participants were injured, decisions denying recovery in 2 
athletic cases and 4 physical education cases were based on 
governmental immunity. Decisions based on no negligence on 
the part of the defendant were handed down in 5 athletic 
cases, 7 physical education cases, and 1 intramural case. 
Recovery was denied on the basis of governmental 
immunity in nine athletic cases in which spectators were 
injured. Recovery was denied in the other seven athletic 
cases on the basis of no negligence on the part of the 
defendant. 
Recovery was allowed in 13 of the 48 cases. In the 
10 cases in which recovery was allowed to injured 
participants. recovery was allowed in 3 athletic cases, 6 
physical education cases, and 1 intramural case. Recovery 
was allowed in the 3 athletic cases, 4 physical education 
cases, and the 1 intramural case for the defendants' 
negligent maintenance of fields (Scott v.State, 1966; 
Lamphear v. State. 1982; Ardoin v. Evangeline Parish 
School Board. 1979; Domino v. Mercurio. 1962) and negligent 
maintenance of gymnasiums (Thomas v. St. Mary's Catholic 
Church. 1979; Bradley v. Board of Education of City of 
Qneonta. 1937; Freund v. Oakland Board of Education. 1938; 
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Wilkinson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. 
1982). In one of the other physical education cases (Bush 
v. Citv of Norwalk. 1937), a balance beam as used on a 
slippery floor constituted a nuisance; in the other (Bauer 
v. Board of Education of City of New York. 1955), negligent 
use of gymnasium space created a dangerous condition. 
In the other three cases in which recovery was 
allowed to injured spectators in athletic cases, recovery 
was allowed because of a breach of duty in maintaining 
unsafe facilities. Recovery was allowed in one of these 
cases because of negligence and an exception was found to 
governmental immunity. Recovery was allowed in Sawaya v. 
Tucson High School District No. 1 (1955) since the 
defendant school district was exercising a proprietary 
function in its negligent maintenance of a football 
stadium. Recovery was allowed also in Board of Education 
of Richmond County v. Fredericks (1966) because the school 
board had constructive notice of the defective condition of 
its stadium but failed to remedy it. In the third case, 
the defendant negligently maintained an ice hockey facility 
by not providing adequate screening to protect spectators 
(Ben.iamin v. State. 1982). 
Six cases were relied on as precedent for decisions in 
subsequent cases (Ingerson v. Shattuck School. 1931; 
Colclough v. Orleans Parish School Board. 1964; Perry 
v. Seattle School District No. 1. 1965; Akins v. Glen Falls 
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City SQhwl District, 1981; Bradley v. Board of Education 
of City of Oneonta. 1937; Ardoin v. Evangeline Parish 
School Board. 1979). Akins (1981), Bradley (1937), and 
Ardoin (1979) were used as precedent in Scaduto v. State 
(1982), Bauer v. Board of Education of City of New York 
(1955), and Wilkinson v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Company (1982) and litigated in the same state—New York, 
New York, and Louisiana, respectively. While the court in 
Turner v. Caddo Parish School Board (1968) relied on 
another Louisiana case as precedent (Colclough. 1964), it 
also relied on Perry (1965), a Washington case. Similarly, 
Perry (1965) relied on a Minnesota case (Ingerson, 1931) 
and a Louisiana case (Colclough. 1964). Of interest is 
the fact that of the case relied on in Turner (1968) and 
the two relied on in Perry (1965) which were not litigated 
in the same state, the precedent-setting cases were not 
even decided in the same region of the country. 
Just as there were no facility cases cited as 
precedent in any of the equipment cases, no equipment 
cases were cited as precedent for any of the facility 
cases. 
Trends' 
Points delineated were derived from the 48 reported 
cases in which the condition of facilities was alleged as 
the proximate cause of injury to participants and 
spectators in school-sponsored sport programs. 
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1. Thirty-one of the 48 cases from 1909 to 1984 were 
reported in the past 24 years. Modifications and 
exceptions to the doctrine of governmental 
immunity through the years may have allowed the 
courts to consider more cases than previously when 
governmental immunity foreclosed litigation. 
2. More cases were reported in school-sponsored 
athletic programs (29) than in physical education 
(17) or intramural (2) programs. 
3. In the reported cases, participants were injured 
more often in physical education programs (17) 
than in athletic (10) or intramural (2) programs. 
4. Most of the injured participants were older, and 
most were male. No sport or activity emerged as 
being associated with a particular defense. 
5. Decisions in most of the participant cases In 
which recovery was denied were based on 
governmental immunity or no negligence on the 
part of the defendant. 
6. While all of the participant cases in which 
recovery was allowed were based on breach of 
duty, two of the cases involved an exception to 
the doctrine of governmental immunity in states 
which had not waived governmental immunity. 
7. All injured spectators were observing athletic 
events at the time of their injury. 
8. Only one spectator was identified as younger. 
While nine were identified as older, there were 
another nine spectator cases in which age could 
not be discerned. 
9. There was no noticeable difference in the number 
of injured spectators who were male (10) than 
who were female (8). 
10. All injured spectators were observing team sport 
events at the time of injury, and four times as 
many (13) were spectators at football games than 
at any other sporting event. 
11. All of the spectator cases in which recovery was 
denied were based on either governmental immunity 
or no negligence. 
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12. Regardless of whether admission was charged for 
athletic events, four of the five courts 
considering this issue viewed such events as 
governmental functions rather than proprietary-
functions, and thus protected by governmental 
immunity, whether participants were injured 
(Mokovich v. Independent School District of 
Virginia. No. 22. 1929) or spectators were injured 
(Reed v, Rhea Comity, 1949; Rhoades v. School 
Pist, No, 9, Roosevelt County, 1943; Riohards v, 
School District of City of Birmingham. . 1957). 
Care must be taken in viewing the points 
delineated as specific trends, for such information has 
been gleaned only from the 48 facility cases reported. 
Information derived from these cases can be valuable in 
helping teachers and coaches integrate such findings in 
their planning, conduct of activities, and assessment. It 
should be recognized, however, that the number of cases 
settled out of court or decided at the trial court level 
and not appealed is unknown; these cases could have 
a significant impact in determining trends. 
A surprising result of this study was the few number 
of equipment and facility cases reported in school-
sponsored sport programs at the college and univerity 
level. The sparsity of cases at this level could well be 
reflective of such suits having been brought strictly 
against manufacturers. When ignoring the school district 
completely and suing a manufacturer, the plaintiff has 
more jurisdictional flexibility. For example, if an 
injury occurs in a strict contributory negligence state 
and there is any question about the injured person's 
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having been contributorily negligent, the plaintiff may 
decide to bring suit against a manufacturer located in a 
state which has no contributory negligence and a high 
level of pay-off possibilities. Although such cases are 
beyond the scope of this study, the possibility of suits 
having been brought directly against manufacturers may 
account for additional cases. 
Guidelines 
Guidelines regarding the condition of facilities in 
school-sponsored sport programs were extrapolated from 
individual cases. With no emphasis on priority, the 
following guidelines are suggested for teachers and 
coaches. These guidelines have been developed from the 
cases considered to recommend positive action for teachers 
and coaches and, as such, are not intended to be inclusive 
of all guidelines to be considered in maintaining safe 
facilities. 
1. Recognize that although school districts are not 
expected to insure the safety of participants or 
spectators, schools do have a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect both participants and 
spectators from dangerous conditions on the school 
premises. Similarly, participants and spectators 
are expected to exercise reasonable care for their 
own safety. 
2. Inspect facilities regularly, periodically, and 
thoroughly for dangerous conditions and complete 
necessary repairs before the facility is used 
again. Outline specific criteria for inspection 
and precise procedures to be followed. 
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3. Maintain school facilities which meet the standard 
considered usual and customary for such facilities 
according to national standards and in relation to 
other schools of similar sise and focus. 
4. Maintain facilities in good condition. Such a 
commitment requires facilities which are properly 
and safely maintained and utiiized for their 
intended purpose. 
5. Recognize that participants and spectators 
utilising school facilities should be expected to 
act as reasonable persons of the same age, 
intelligence, and experience would act. 
6. Integrate in using and maintaining facilities, 
knowledge that while both participants and 
spectators assume the risks normally associated 
with participating in or observing a sport or 
activity, they do not assume the risk of dangerous 
or defective conditions of facilities. 
7. Apply the knowledge, when considering providing 
permanent barriers to keep spectators a safe 
distance from the playing field, that a higher 
degree of care is expected for events attracting 
large crowds than for more informal second and 
third-team and intramural contests where no 
admission is charged and spectators are mostly 
relatives or friends of the participants. 
8. Provide protective screening behind home plate at 
baseball facilities since this area is the one in 
which the danger of being struck by a baseball is 
the greatest. Additionally, provide a sufficient 
number of seats in the area for as many spectators 
as reasonably may be expected to sit there. 
9. Recognise that although actual notice demands 
repair of a dangerous condition of a facility, 
constructive notice is equally binding in the eyes 
of the courts. In other words, even though a 
dangerous condition may not actuallly have been 
called to one's attention, inspection of the area 
should reveal the hazard and result in the 
elimination of the dangerous condition. 
10. Maintain playing fields which are free of any 
obstacles or other conditions which could endanger 
the safety of those utilising the facilities. 
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11. Replace all glass-paneled or wire-meshed glass 
doors or windows with safety glass or some other 
such type of material which will not shatter on 
impact. 
12. Pad gymnasium walls and abutments located where 
players might run into them sufficiently to 
protect the participants. 
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Chapter V 
SUMMARY, REVIEW, AND CONCLUSIONS 
While teachers and coaches are not expected to insure 
the safety of participants or spectators, they must use 
due care to provide and maintain adequate and safe 
equipment and facilities for persons engaging in.,or 
observing school-sponsored sport programs. Court decisions 
have provided sound direction to help educators plan and 
conduct safe athletic, physical education, and intramural 
programs. 
Summary 
A total of 59 cases was analysed for the study. Two 
cases involved both equipment and facilities and were 
analyzed under each area (Chapters III and IV). 
There were 13 reported cases in which the condition 
of equipment was alleged as the proximate cause of injury 
in school-sponsored sport programs. Five cases were 
reported in athletics, five in physical education, and 
three in intramurals. All injured students were 
participants at the time of their injury. More of the 
injured students were older, more were males, and 10 of the 
13 activities in which they were participating were 
different. 
Recovery was denied in six of the equipment cases. 
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The courts based decisions denying recovery on governmental 
immunity in three cases and on no negligence in three. 
Recovery was allowed in seven equipment cases. 
Decisions favoring injured participants were based on the 
defendants' negligence in providing dangerous and defective 
equipment, failing to remedy a dangerous condition after 
notice, maintaining a nuisance, failing to properly 
position mats for landings, and failing to provide proper 
protective equipment. 
There were 48 reported cases in which the condition of 
facilities was alleged as the proximate cause of injury in 
school-sponsored sport programs. Twenty-nine of the cases 
involved injury to participants and 19 to spectators. 
Of the 29 cases in which participants were injured, 
10 were reported in athletics, 17 in physical education, 
and 2 in intramurals. Most of the injured participants 
were older and most were males. The activities in which 
these participants were injured involved both individual 
and team sports or activities. 
Recovery was denied in 19 participant cases. The 
courts based decisions denying recovery on governmental 
immunity in 6 cases and on no negligence in 13 cases. 
Recovery was allowed in 10 participant cases. 
Decisions favoring injured participants were based on the 
defendants' negligent maintenance of fields and gymnasiums, 
maintenance of a nuisance, and negligent use of gymnasium 
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space. 
Of the 19 cases in which spectators were injured, all 
injuries were reported in athletics. Age could not be 
discerned in almost half of the cases. Of the other 10 
spectators, 9 were older. There was no meaningful 
difference in the number of injured males (10) in 
comparison with females (8). All injured spectators were 
observing team sports at the time of injury, and most were 
attending football games. 
Recovery was denied in 16 spectator cases. The 
courts based decisions denying recovery on governmental 
immunity in 9 cases and on no negligence in 7 cases. 
Recovery was allowed in three spectator cases. 
Decisions favoring injured spectators were based on the 
defendants' failure to maintain safe conditions at football 
stadiums and failure to provide adequate protective 
screening at an ice hockey arena. 
While there was only one equipment case relied on 
by another court as precedent, there were six facility 
cases used as precedent by subsequent courts. No facility 
cases were cited as precedent for equipment cases, and no 
equipment cases cited as precedent for facility cases. 
Review 
Six questions were formulated to guide the study: 
1. What have the courts said regarding the condition 
of equipment in athletic, physical education, and 
149 
intramural programs? 
2. Are there specific trends which can be determined 
from the examination and analysis of the court 
cases regarding equipment? 
3. Based on established case precedent, what are 
practical guidelines which educators can use when 
making decision about equipment? 
4. What have the courts said regarding the condition 
of facilities in athletic, physical education, and 
intramural programs? 
5. Are there specific trends which can be determined 
from the examination and analysis of the court 
cases regarding facilities? 
6. Based on established case precedent, what are 
practical guidelines which educators can use when 
making decisions about facilities? 
The courts have given specific direction about 
equipment utilized in school-sponsored sport programs. 
Equipment must meet the standards considered usual and 
customary by the profession and must be provided to 
participants engaged in these programs. Equipment must be 
inspected regularly and replaced or discarded when unsafe 
for the intended purpose. Teachers and coaches must 
recognise that participants may only be expected to act as 
reasonable persons of the same age, intelligence, and 
experience would act. A greater duty of care is expected 
150 
of teachers and coaches working with younger children. 
The courts also have given specific direction about 
facilities utilized in school-sponsored sport programs. 
Facilities must meet the standards considered usual and 
customary and must be inspected according to specific 
predetermined criteria on a regular and periodic basis. 
If inspection reveals dangerous or defective conditions, 
repairs must be made before the facility is used again. 
While participants and spectators are expected to use due 
care for their own safety when utilizing facilities, these 
individuals have the right to expect that facilities will 
be safe and do not assume the risk of dangerous or 
defective conditions. 
Teachers and coaches involved with the conduct of 
athletic programs should recognize that careful attention 
must be given to providing safe facilities for spectators, 
for all cases involving litigation resulting from injury 
to spectators occurred during school-sponsored athletic 
events. A higher degree of care is expected for athletic 
events attracting large crowds. 
Neither participants nor spectators assume the risk 
of defective equipment or dangerous facilities. While 
teachers and coaches are not expected to insure the safety 
of either participants or spectators, persons in either of 
these roles should be able to assume that the condition of 
equipment and facilities is safe in regard to the intended 
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purpose. 
Conclusions 
There are four salient features which have emerged 
from the analysis of reported court decisions in 
school-sponsored sport programs in which the condition of 
equipment and facilities has been alleged as the proximate 
cause of injury to participants and spectators. These four 
features are viewed as trends in that, as a general 
tendency, they have persisted over time from the first 
reported case in 1909 through the last in 1984. 
In comparison with the small number of reported 
equipment cases, the significantly larger number of cases 
brought by participants and spectators alleging injury due 
to the unsafe or dangerous condition of facilities appears 
to be a trend in itself. This occurrence may be related, to 
some extent, to the frequency with which equipment is used 
in or on a facility. 
While it was anticipated that the number of decisions 
based on governmental immunity would decrease through the 
years, this premise was not supported by the cases 
analysed. For equipment and facility cases, the number of 
cases based on governmental immunity remained relatively 
constant within and across the decades from the 1920s 
through the first four years of the 1980s. When viewed 
historically, however, this occurrence is not surprising. 
When governmental immunity provided absolute immunity to 
152 
school districts, litigation was foreclosed. It is likely 
that as long as educational institutions were cloaked with 
governmental immunity, many cases based on such immunity 
never reached the appellate courts. Over the years, 
however, modifications and exceptions to the doctrine of 
governmental immunity likely allowed the appellate courts 
to consider more of these cases. Lowering the previous 
barrier actually allowed for more lawsuits rather than 
fewer. 
Although several authors (Appenzeller, 1978; Arnold, 
1983; Nygaard & Boone, 1981) have observed that America is 
becoming an increasingly litigious society, the data from 
this study do not seem to support their premise. The 
number of cases in this study, in fact, may suggest the 
opposite. Over the years, the increase in the number of 
participants in school-sponsored sport programs and the 
effect of previous barriers to litigation based on 
governmental immunity having been lowered would lead one 
to expect a much larger number of reported cases. 
It seems clear that when an educational institution or 
its employees have been protected from liability by 
governmental immunity, neither age, role, sex of the 
injured party, nor the sport or activity within which the 
injury occurred in any of the school-sponsored sport 
programs would appear to influence the decision of the 
court. Generally, even when the doctrine of governmental 
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immunity has not been the legal principle applied by the 
courts, neither age, role, sex, nor the sport or activity 
(individually or in combination) has been an influential 
factor in the decision. Court decisions consistently have 
been based on the presence or absence of the four elements 
necessary to prove negligence and the legal principle 
applied by the court in adjudicating the case. Only when 
the defense of contributory negligence has been used have 
the courts seemed to have considered any of the elements as 
guiding the decision. In regard to age, the younger the 
injured party, the less likely the defense of contributory 
negligence will be upheld. 
Participants and spectators have the right to expect 
that equipment and facilities utilized in school-sponsored 
sport programs will be of standard quality and in good 
repair. The courts have provided sound guidance about the 
expected condition of safe equipment in a safe environment. 
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CODING SHEET 
Proximate Equipment and/or 
Cause: Facilities 
Program: Athletics, 
Physical Education, 
or Intramurals 
Condition: 
Case: 
Date: 
Age 
Y/0 
Role 
P/s 
Sex 
M/F 
Sport/Activity 
I5Sue: 
Zaeia: 
Prinoiple Defendant: 
Decision: 
Leftel Principle Applied: 
Rule or Legal Precedent Established: 
Speoial CiremnstanQes: 
Discussion: 
Personal impresgions: 
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IMMUNITY BY JUDICIAL ACTION 
STATES ABROGATING THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY BY JUDICIAL ACTION 
Arizona 
Colorado 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Mas s achus ett s 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Jersey-
Pennsylvania 
Texas 
(33 A.L.R. 3d 703, 1970) 
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STATES INCLUDING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR ENACTING 
STATUTES TO CHANGE THE COMMON LAW RULE 
OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
Alabama Nevada 
Alaska New Jersey 
California New York 
Connecticut North Carolina 
Florida Ohio 
Georgia Oklahoma 
Illinois Oregon 
Iowa Pennsylvania 
Kentucky Rhode Island 
Louisiana South Carolina 
Maryland South Dakota 
Michigan Texas 
Minnesota Washington 
Mississippi West Virginia 
Missouri Wisconsin 
(33 A.L.R.3d 703, 1970) 
